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INTRODUCTION
At the end of each college football and basketball season,
coaches in the early years of multi-year term contracts (under
which they agreed to perform exclusively for the school for the
entire contract term) consider more lucrative offers from other
schools that freely solicit them to fill their coaching vacancies,
causing the coaches to break their existing contracts with their
schools, and leaving vacancies for the jilted schools to fill in the
same manner.1 This is known as the “college coaching carousel”
in big-time intercollegiate athletics,2 and it has been causing
coaches’ salaries to spiral out of control into the $2, $3 and $4
million dollar ranges and climbing, which some critics have
1

See, e.g., Steve Wieberg & Jodi Upton, The Money Game, USA TODAY, Dec. 5,
2007, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2007-12-04coaches-pay_N.htm [hereinafter Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game].
2
See, e.g., CBSSports.com, 2007–08 College Football Coaching Carousel,
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/10491600 (last visited Sept. 21, 2009).
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characterized as “eye-popping, mind-boggling” and which “[s]ort
of takes your breath away in this economic environment.”3 While
the “have nots” continue to complain about cost containment and
too much commercialization in intercollegiate athletics and the
NCAA asserts it is powerless to do anything, the “haves” are the
ones pushing the carousel because they generate the revenue to
offset the huge financial liability created by buyouts and lucrative
coaches’ salaries.4
College coaches are not at-will employees; they promise to
perform exclusively for the school for a period of years in
exchange for an exorbitant guaranteed salary for the duration of
that period.5 The problem is that these contracts are a one-way
street from an enforcement standpoint. The schools continue to
reward coaches with contract extensions and salary raises after one
winning season, and schools remain liable for the coach’s
guaranteed salary for the remainder of the term when they
terminate him without cause; the schools also, however, let
coaches walk away at will and go work for, and be solicited by,
their competitors with impunity.6 To be certain, this is not
representative of free market competition, but rather unfair
competition. The purpose of this paper is not to criticize how
much money coaches make, but to encourage our public academic
institutions, which owe a moral and ethical duty to their student
bodies, their student-athletes and society at large, to exercise fiscal
responsibility and restraint by simply deterring their coaches from
breaching their contractual obligations and their competitors from
interfering with contractual relations. This paper analyzes the
economics of college coaches’ contracts and uses it as justification
and support for universities to look closer at their legal options,
rights and remedies.

3

Steve Wieberg, Brand: ‘Hard Questions’ Need to Be Asked About Rising Salaries,
USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/
2009-04-02-brand-salaries_N.htm [hereinafter Wieberg, Hard Questions] (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting University of Hartford President, Walt Harrison).
4
See id.; see also Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1.
5
See, e.g., Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A Practical
Perspective, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 127, 134–35 (2001).
6
Id. at 135–36, 226.
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Part I of this paper will address the economics of coaches’
contracts in big-time college football and men’s basketball. It will
discuss the contributing factors for the dramatic increase in
coaches’ compensation in recent years, including the desire to win
and the prospects of generating more revenue, the granting of
contract extensions to keep winning coaches from being poached
(with five specific examples of recent extensions), the payment of
huge buyouts when coaches do not win, and the tremendous
leverage that coaches have over schools in the hiring and contract
negotiation process. Part II will address the options and remedies
schools have to deter coaches from jumping ship before the
expiration of their contracts. Specifically, this Part will examine
the use and validity of liquidated damages clauses given the
unquantifiable nature of the damages incurred by the school as a
result of the loss of a head coach, and the difficulties of suing for
damages in the absence of a liquidated damages clause. It will also
discuss the viability of the negative injunction to prevent a coach
from working for another institution, including how college
coaches meet the unique skills test for the requisite showing of
irreparable harm and how a balancing of the harms to the parties,
the public interest and the interest of student-athletes weighs
heavily in favor of granting injunctive relief. This paper concludes
by addressing some practical considerations for schools in seeking
injunctive relief, such as whether the existence or non-existence of
a liquidated damages clause impacts the availability of injunctive
relief, the likelihood of a quick settlement, and whether the school
should be concerned about having to keep an “unhappy coach.”
I.

THE ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE COACHES’ CONTRACTS

In 2007, for the first time, the average earnings of the majorcollege football coaches reached $1 million, which does not even
include benefits, perks and performance bonuses.7 This included
7

See Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1. For summaries of the
material terms contained in numerous college football and men’s basketball head
coaches’ contracts, see Coastal Law Sports Law Coaching Contracts,
http://www.fcsl.edu/node/174 (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). “A coach’s base salary is . . . a
small piece of his overall guaranteed compensation package” which typically includes
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at least fifty coaches who made seven figures, which was seven
more than in 2006, and at least twelve coaches who earned $2
million or more, up from nine in 2006.8 By 2008, in college
football there were twenty-three coaches who were making at least
$2 million,9 which included one coach reportedly making in excess
of $4 million10 and at least seven other coaches who had broken
the $3 million mark.11 At the start of the 2009 football season,
Notre Dame’s Charlie Weiss and Florida’s Urban Meyer became
the second and third coaches to break the $4 million mark and at
least sixty-nine coaches were making $1 million or more.12 Setting
the market in college basketball by 2009 were Kentucky’s John
“income guaranteed by their institutions from media and apparel deals, speaking fees and
football camps.” Peter J. Schwartz, The Best (and Worst) College Football Coaches for
the Buck, FORBES.COM, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/13/footballcarroll-tressel-biz-sports-cz_pjs_0813coaches.html [hereinafter Schwartz, The Best (and
Worst)]; see also Greenberg, supra note 5, at 134 (“The package might include shoe,
apparel and equipment endorsements, television, radio and Internet shows, speaking
engagements, personal or public appearances, and summer instructional camps. In
addition, the job may also mean such related perquisites as housing, insurance premiums,
annuities, membership in health and country clubs, financial gifts from alumni and
boosters, business opportunities, and the use of automobiles.”). Throughout this paper,
all references to dollar figures in compensation or salary shall mean a coach’s guaranteed
compensation in the contract irrespective of how the compensation is characterized in the
contract, i.e. base salary, endorsement compensation, guaranteed bonuses, etc., and do
not include benefits, perks and performance bonuses.
8
Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1.
9
Tom Dienhart, Calipari Deal Good News for Football Coaches, RIVALS.COM, Apr.
13, 2009, http://collegefootball.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=934841.
10
Southern California’s Pete Carroll earns a reported $4.4 million a year. See Tom
Van Riper, The Highest-Paid Coaches, YAHOO! SPORTS, May 14, 2009,
http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug=ysforbescoachespay051409&prov=yhoo&type=l
gns.
11
These coaches include Florida’s Urban Meyer, Notre Dame’s Charlie Weiss,
Alabama’s Nick Saban, LSU’s Les Miles, Ohio State’s Jim Tressel, Oklahoma’s Bob
Stoops, and Iowa’s Kirk Ferentz. Id. Tressel’s average annual salary was increased from
$2.6 million to $3.5 million in late August, 2008. See Ken Gordon, New Salary for
Tressel Ranks No. 1 in Big Ten, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 2008, at 1A, available at
http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/sports/stories/2008/08/30/tressel_contract.ART_A
RT_08-30-08_A1_4QB6A4A.html?sid=101.
12
See Ranking Salaries of Head Football Coaches in Football Bowl Subdivision,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 29, 2009, at C1, available at
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/college/orlsportseconchart30b073009jul30,0,6128
405.story; see also Robbie Andreu, UF Gives Meyer New 6-Year Contract,
GAINESVILLESUN.COM, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.gainesville.com/article/20090803/
ARTICLES/908039934/1109/SPORTS?Title=UF-gives-Meyer-new-6-year-contract.
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Calipari earning $3.7 million,13 Florida’s Billy Donovan at $3.5
million and Kansas’s Bill Self at $3 million.14 Other basketball
coaches at the $2 million mark include Louisville’s Rick Pitino,
North Carolina’s Roy Williams and Duke’s Mike Krzyzewski.15
The “athletics arms race” in big-time collegiate athletics is
certainly apparent when one compares these numbers to 1999,
when only five coaches at major college football programs were
making $1 million.16
A. The Revenue Factor
What is contributing to the dramatic increase in compensation
of college football and basketball coaches? One legal scholar
opines that some of the factors that have contributed to the rise in
salaries of college football coaches are (1) the proliferation of
revenue generated from football bowl games and television
contracts, (2) the substantial rise since the mid-1990s in agents
representing coaches, and (3) increased competition for coaches
fueled by the desire of National Football League (“NFL”) teams to
hire college coaches and colleges to hire NFL coaches.17
Similarly, Peter Schwartz of Forbes Magazine noted that, in
football, “Escalating revenues from television, fat donations from
boosters and bidding wars with rival schools (and in some cases
the NFL) led to 56 coaches taking home $1 million or more in
2007.”18
The top revenue producers in collegiate athletics—Alabama,
Florida, Kansas, Louisiana State and Notre Dame, among others—
are continuously willing to push the envelope on football and
basketball coaches’ compensation for the prospect of having
successful programs, which has led to the rapid escalation in
salaries in recent years.19 Indeed, the revenues generated in big-

13

See Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3.
Dienhart, supra note 9.
15
Id.
16
See Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1.
17
MATTHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH & ROBERT C. BERRY,
SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 370–71 (2d ed. 2009).
18
Schwartz, The Best (and Worst), supra note 7.
19
See supra notes 9, 13–15 and accompanying text.
14
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time collegiate athletics in recent years can support the rising
salaries. In the 2007–08 school year, the top twenty revenue
producers in college athletics each generated total revenue in
excess of $75 million:20

20

School

2007–08 Total Revenue

1. Texas

$120,288,370

2. Ohio State

$117,953,712

3. Florida

$106,030,895

4. Michigan

$99,027,105

5. Wisconsin

$93,452,334

6. Penn State

$91,570,233

7. Auburn

$89,305,326

8. Alabama

$88,869,810

9. Tennessee

$88,719,798

10. Oklahoma State

$88,554,438

11. Kansas

$86,009,257

12. Louisiana State

$84,183,362

13. Georgia

$84,020,180

14. Notre Dame

$83,352,439

15. Iowa

$81,148,310

16. Michigan State

$77,738,746

17. Oklahoma

$77,098,009

18. Stanford

$76,661,466

19. Southern California

$76,409,919

20. Nebraska

$75,492,884

Top Revenue Producers in College Athletics, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUS. J., June
15, 2009, at 26, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/62825
[hereinafter Top Revenue Producers] (based on Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act
documents filed by each school with the Department of Education).
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On an individual sport level, football by far generates the most
revenue at the top revenue producing schools.21 The top ten
revenue producers in football in the 2007–08 school year each
generated between $52 and $73 million in revenue, reflecting a
percentage of the school’s total revenue in the range of 55 and
80%:22
School

2007–08 Football
Revenue

Percentage of
Total Revenue
(rounded to the
nearest tenth of
one percent)

1. Texas

$72,952,397

60.6%

2. Georgia

$67,053,051

79.8%

3. Florida

$66,124,945

62.4%

4. Ohio State

$65,162,179

55.2%

5. Notre Dame

$59,774,851

71.7%

6. Auburn

$59,671,354

66.8%

7. Michigan

$57,463,603

58.0%

8. Alabama

$57,370,617

64.5%

9. Penn State

$53,766,038

58.7%

10. Louisiana State

$52,687,713

62.6%

The revenue generated in basketball, however, paints a
completely different picture and pales in comparison to the
revenue generated in football.23 The top ten revenue producers in

21

See id.
Percentage of a school’s total revenue equals the revenue from a sport divided by the
total revenue. See id.
23
According to Oklahoma Athletic Director Joe Castiglione, “Sheer numbers alone
[ticket sales, donations related to benefits, premium seats and suites] would account for
most of the difference [between football and basketball revenue].” Dienhart, supra note 9
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
22
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basketball in the 2007–08 school year each generated between $14
and $24 million in revenue:24
School

2007–08 Basketball
Revenue

1. Louisville

$23,519,846

2. North Carolina

$17,831,583

3. Indiana

$17,037,443

4. Arizona

$16,417,302

5. Arkansas

$16,099,373

6. Syracuse

$15,997,638

7. Duke

$15,903,075

8. Michigan State

$15,839,369

9. Wisconsin

$14,962,970

10. Kentucky

$14,867,027

As evidenced by the above data, all of the top ten revenue
producers in football were among the top twenty in total revenue.25
In contrast, of the top ten revenue producers in basketball, only
two schools, Michigan State and Wisconsin, were among the top
twenty in total revenue.26 However, the percentage of total
revenue generated by the basketball programs at Michigan State
and Wisconsin was only 20.4% and 16%, respectively.27
If the salaries of football and basketball coaches are a reflection
of the revenue generated by their respective sports, then the large
disparity in revenue between the two sports leads one to question:
whether perhaps football coaches are underpaid or, conversely,
basketball coaches are overpaid. To illustrate the point, the 2007
24

See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See id.
26
See id.
27
Percentage of total revenue that is Michigan State’s basketball revenue is
$15,839,369/$77,738,746=20.4% and percentage for Wisconsin’s basketball revenue is
$14,962,970/$93,452,334=16%. See id.
25
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salary of Florida football coach Urban Meyer was $3.25 million28
and represented 4.9% of Florida’s football revenue generated in the
2007–08 school year.29 Alabama’s Nick Saban and Notre Dame’s
Charlie Weiss, who each earned roughly $4.0 million in 2007,30
were paid salaries representing 7.0% and 6.7%, respectively, of
their school’s football revenue generated in the 2007–08 school
year.31 In basketball, the $2 million salaries of Louisville’s Rick
Pitino, North Carolina’s Roy Williams and Duke’s Mike
Krzyzewski32 represented approximately 8.5%, 11.2% and 12.6%,
respectively, of their school’s basketball revenue generated in the
2007–08 school year.33
Thus, while the highest-paid football coaches are earning
roughly 5% to 6% of their school’s football-related revenue, the
highest-paid basketball coaches are earning more than twice that
percentage of their school’s basketball-related revenue. Indeed,
comparing John Calipari’s $3.7 million salary, which he started
earning when he signed with Kentucky in April of 2009,34 with
Kentucky’s basketball revenue generated in the 2007–08 school
year represents a whopping 25%.35 It remains to be seen what
impact, if any, Calipari’s contract will have on football coaches’
contracts. According to Rivals.com College Football Senior
28

See Donovan and Meyer: Highest-Paid Tandem?, ESPN.COM, June 8, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2897946.
29
Percentage of Florida’s football revenue that is Urban Meyer’s salary is
$3,250,000/$66,124,945=4.9%. See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
30
See Monte Burke, The Most Powerful Coach in Sports, FORBES.COM, Sept. 1, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0901/092.html; Jodi Upton, Saban’s Contract Could
Bring Congressional Inquiry, USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/college/football/sec/2007-01-03-saban-contract_x.htm.
31
Percentage of Alabama’s football revenue that is Nick Saban’s salary is
$4,000,000/$57,370,617=7.0%; percentage of Notre Dame’s football revenue that is
Charlie Weiss’s salary is $4,000,000/$59,774,851=6.7%. See Top Revenue Producers,
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
32
See Dienhart, supra note 9.
33
Percentage of Louisville’s basketball revenue that is Rick Pittino’s salary is
$2,000,000/$23,519,846=8.5%; percentage of North Carolina’s basketball revenue that is
Roy Williams’s salary is $2,000,000/$17,831,583=11.2%; percentage of Duke’s
basketball revenue that is Mike Krzyzewski’s salary is $2,000,000/$15,903,075=12.6%.
See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
34
See Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3.
35
See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Writer Tom Dienhart, Calipari’s deal will likely push the salaries
of college football coaches even higher:
Football is a much bigger revenue-producer on
college campuses than basketball, so it stands to
reason the football coach almost always will be
higher paid.
....
. . . And if a basketball coach now is being paid
almost as much as the highest-paid football coach, it
stands to reason football coaches will see their
salaries rise. In fact, college football may have a $5
million–$6 million per year coach in the next few
seasons.36
B. The High Cost of a Highly Successful Coach
“It’s a difficult line presidents, chancellors and athletic
administrators have to walk. You depend on the revenue of certain
sports, and if you don’t have quality coaches who continue to bring
in that revenue, especially if you have a highly successful coach
who is in demand, you’re caught.
If you lose that coach, will a school suffer a revenue drop?
And if I don’t pay this coach and lose him, does it signify that a
school isn’t committed to a program? You could lose donations,
ticket sales and television appearances, and that affects the other
programs.

36

Dienhart, supra note 9. It also remains to be seen what impact Calipari’s contract
will have on the women’s basketball coaches market. According to Bob Lattinville, an
attorney who represents college coaches, “In the last 10 years, the increases in salaries
have been exponential . . . . They have, in some respects, tracked the men’s game.” Stu
Durando, Fortunes Soar for Women’s Coaches, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 26,
2009, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 2001, a study conducted by the
Women’s Basketball Coaches Association showed that the average salary was $86,199,
and by 2009, the average salary in the Big 12 conference was $548,000 and $345,000 in
the Big Ten conference. Id. The highest-paid women’s basketball coaches in 2009 were
Connecticut’s Geno Auriemma, with a 5-year, $8 million contract, Tennessee’s Pat
Summitt, with a $1.275 million salary, and Baylor’s Kim Mulkey and Texas’ Gail
Goestenkors, with $1 million salaries. Id.
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I think it’s a heck of a conundrum.”37
– Big 12 Commissioner Dan Beebe
The cost of hiring and keeping a successful coach can be
substantial and may consist of (1) the coach’s guaranteed
compensation package plus benefits and perks, as well as raises in
guaranteed compensation following successful seasons pursuant to
any contract extensions, (2) performance-based incentives for
successful seasons throughout the term of the contract, (3) the
payment of a buyout that is owed to a coach who is fired, and (4) a
payment on behalf of a newly-hired coach for liquidated damages
that is owed by the coach to his previous employer for breach of
contract by failing to perform for the remainder of the term.38 As
observed by two sports reporters:
The marketplace shudders at the end of every
season. Coaches retire, resign and are fired, and
schools eager to preserve or upgrade their programs
chase the most attractive replacements. Others try
to keep their coaches from being poached.39
1. Guaranteed Salary Raises: The Cost of Contract Extensions
The proliferation of schools trying “to keep their coaches from
being poached”40 in recent years has resulted in a flux of contract
extensions that involve a consistent theme. The team has a
successful season and the coach, who has multiple years remaining
under the term of his existing contract, is rewarded with a
substantial raise in guaranteed compensation for another multi-year
term (typically at least five years).41 Sometimes negotiations are
contentious.42 However, a successful season provides the coach
37

Blair Kerkhoff, College Coaches Get Richer as Programs Try to Trim Other Costs,
KAN. CITY STAR, June 1, 2009, http://www.kansascity.com/sports/story/1228663.html
(quoting Big 12 Commissioner, Dan Beebe).
38
For an in-depth and comprehensive discussion, as well as specific examples, of the
various guaranteed and non-guaranteed sources of income in college coaches’ contracts,
see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 170–208.
39
Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1.
40
Id.
41
See id.
42
See Tim Griffin, As Meeting Nears, ‘Stalemate Not Good,’ ESPN.COM, Feb. 19,
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=3918813&type=story.
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with tremendous leverage and oftentimes there is minimal
negotiation between the university and coach over compensation
and term, which in and of itself creates a very unusual market
dynamic involving a buyer and seller of services in an arm’s length
transaction.43 Thus, a coach who has a successful season typically
receives not only the incentive bonuses provided under his existing
contract that were initially agreed upon in contemplation of future
successful performance during the term of the contract, but the
school also extends his contract providing the coach with
additional guaranteed compensation for future years irrespective of
performance in those years. These dynamics are illustrated by
recent contract extensions of coaches at Florida, Louisiana State,
Kansas, Texas Tech and Cincinnati.
a) Florida’s Billy Donovan and Urban Meyer
In 2007, the University of Florida won both the football and
basketball national championships simultaneously, a first in majorcollege sports history.44 Billy Donovan coached the Florida
basketball team to consecutive national championships, as his team
also won the national championship in 2006, and Urban Meyer
was only in his second season as head football coach at Florida
when his team won the 2007 BCS National Championship.45 In
June of 2007, Florida rewarded Donovan and Meyer each with a
new six-year contract, making them the nation’s highest-paid
basketball-football coaching tandem and together costing the
university more than $40 million through 2013.46 At the time, it
was reported that these two contract extensions made Donovan the
highest-paid basketball coach and Meyer the second highest-paid
football coach at a public school.47 When the extensions were
announced, Florida Athletic Director Jeremy Foley said, “I

43

See infra text accompanying notes 59–60.
See Donovan and Meyer, supra note 28.
45
Id.
46
Under the contracts, Donovan is paid $3.5 million annually and Meyer is paid $3.25
million annually. Id.
47
Id.
44
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understand those numbers are significant . . . but it’s the market for
having highly successful coaches.”48
Foley’s comment prompts two pertinent questions. First, what
is the definition of a “highly successful coach” and, second, how is
the market determined? Florida assessed Donovan’s market value
at $3.5 million per year when it signed him to a $21 million, sixyear contract and Meyer’s market value at $3.25 million when it
signed him to a $19.5 million, six-year contract.49 At the time the
contract extension was signed, Donovan achieved an overall winloss record of 261–103 in eleven seasons at Florida, which
included nine NCAA tournament appearances, but his performance
prior to winning the national championships in 2006 and 2007
certainly would not justify making him the highest-paid college
basketball coach in the country.50 Meyer, on the other hand, was
only in his second year at Florida when his team won the national
championship in 2007.51 The year before that, Meyer’s team had
fourteen starting players return from the previous year (seven on
offense and seven on defense) and the team finished with a 9–3
record (5–3 in the conference), including a win at the Outback
Florida made the
Bowl following the regular season.52
determination that Donovan’s and Meyer’s performances justified
giving them contract extensions that would make them the highestpaid and second highest-paid public school coaches, respectively,
and the highest-paid basketball-football coaching tandem in the
nation.53
In the first year of Donovan’s new six-year contract, which was
the 2007–08 basketball season, the basketball team had an overall

48

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Foley’s announcement followed Donovan’s
news conference Thursday during which he apologized to the Orlando Magic, his family
and the [Florida] Gators for changing his mind . . . to opt out of the 5-year, $27.5 million
contract signed [with the Magic] last week.” Id. The day before the news conference,
Donovan reached a deal with the Magic and opted out of that agreement. Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See GatorZone.com, UF Football Schedule and Results, 2005 Season,
http://www.gatorzone.com/sched.php?sport=footb&curyearb=2005&submita=1 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2009).
53
See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text.
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win-loss record of 24–12 (8–8 in the conference) and did not even
qualify for the NCAA tournament.54 Donovan’s team did not fare
much better in the second year of his contract, as the team had an
overall record of 25–11 (9–7 in the conference) and for the second
straight year did not qualify for the NCAA tournament.55 Notably,
for the second straight year Donovan’s six-year contract was not
extended.56
In the first year of Meyer’s new six-year contract, which was
the 2007–08 football season, the football team finished with a 9–4
record (5–3 in the conference), including a loss against the
University of Michigan in a non-BCS bowl game, the Capital One
Bowl.57 Meyer’s contract was not extended following that season.
However, the next year Meyer’s team won the 2009 BCS National
Championship Game, finishing with a 13–1 record (7–1 in the
conference).58 A few months later on May 30, 2009, University of
Florida President Bernie Machen announced that Meyer would
receive a significant raise to his $3.25 million annual
compensation.59 Although Meyer still had four years remaining on
his six-year contract and Machen acknowledged that he does not
know whether Meyer should be the nation’s highest-paid coach
because he does not “know the market,” Machen proclaimed, “He

54

See GatorZone.com, UF Basketball Schedule and Results, 2007 Season,
http://www.gatorzone.com/basketball/men/history/2007/review.pdf (last visited Oct. 16,
2009).
55
See GatorZone.com, UF Basketball Schedule and Results, 2008 Season,
http://www.gatorzone.com/basketball/men/history/2008/review.pdf (last visited Oct. 16,
2009).
56
Author’s Note: Please note that news sources normally do not report non-extensions
on long-term coaching contracts with multiple years remaining.
57
See Gator Zone.com, UF Football Schedule and Results, 2007 Season,
http://www.gatorzone.com/sched.php?sport=footb&curyearb=2007&submita=1 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2009).
58
See GatorZone.com, UF Football Schedule and Results, 2008 Season,
http://www.gatorzone.com/sched.php?sport=footb&curyearb=2008&submita=1 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2009).
59
Jeremy Fowler, UF President: Meyer Should Be SEC’s Top-Paid Coach, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 30, 2009, at C1, available at http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/sports_
college_uf/2009/05/uf-prez-hopes-urban-meyer-becomes-secs-highestpaid-coach.html
(“Despite the negative public perception of spending money on athletics while academics
suffer, Machen said Gator athletics will move forward without the fear of spending.”).
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should be (the SEC’s highest) . . . . He’s the best.”60 On August 3,
2009, Florida announced that Meyer signed a new six-year contract
that raises his salary by $750,000 and guarantees him $4 million
annually.61 At the time of the announcement, Florida Athletic
Director Jeremy Foley said, “Coach Meyer has certainly proven to
be one of the top college football coaches in the country and
should be compensated as such.”62
Perhaps Florida’s definition of a highly successful coach is one
that deserves a significant raise in guaranteed annual compensation
for a period of years immediately following a successful season (or
a national championship).63 And the market is determined by
Florida. One way to view a contract extension when the coach has
a successful season during the term of an existing contract is that
the coach is receiving a very large performance bonus in the form
of higher multi-year guaranteed compensation that was not
provided for in the existing contract, in addition to any incentive
bonuses that the coach is entitled to receive under the existing
contract based upon successful performance in any season during
the term.64 In other words, it is almost as if the school is saying to
the coach, “we originally agreed that you deserve to be paid an
additional amount of $X if you win a national championship, but
now that you won it, we think you deserve to be paid a lot more.”
b) Louisiana State’s Les Miles
Despite Bernie Machen’s desire to make Urban Meyer the
highest-paid coach in the conference, it may not be possible
because Louisiana State football coach Les Miles has an escalator
clause in his contract that must keep him the conference’s top
earner.65 The escalator clause in Miles’ contract is an interesting
twist not only in terms of how the market is determined, but also
from the standpoint that the coach continues to receive raises in
60

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Andreu, supra note 12.
62
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
63
See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
64
“Meyer made $375,000 in bonuses last season for winning the BCS national and
SEC titles and finishing in the top 10.” Andreu, supra note 12.
65
Fowler, supra note 59.
61
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guaranteed compensation throughout the contract term regardless
of performance, i.e. whether or not he is a “highly successful
coach.”66 Conceivably, there can only be one highest-paid coach
in the conference and as long as Miles’ contract with LSU contains
the escalator clause, he must be the one. However, it raises an
interesting question, beyond the scope of this article, as to which
school’s escalator clause would govern if another school in the
conference included a similar clause in the contract with its coach.
How the escalator clause in Miles’s contract came to fruition is
especially noteworthy. Less than one week after LSU landed a
berth in the national championship game in January of 2008, and
five days after Miles decided not to accept the vacant coaching
position at Michigan, Miles and LSU entered a $12 million, fouryear contract extension.67 Miles had three salary escalators in his
original contract that were also carried over to his new
agreement—one required LSU to make him at least the
Southeastern Conference’s (“SEC”) fifth-highest paid coach if the
team wins ten games, another guaranteed he would be the SEC’s
third-highest if the team wins a conference championship, and the
third one guaranteed he would be “the nation’s third-highest paid
coach if LSU wins the national title.”68 Within months, changes
needed to be made to the new contract because LSU ended up
winning the national championship game and the University could
not verify the salaries of coaches at private universities, which are
not required by law to disclose their salaries, such as Notre Dame’s
Charlie Weiss and Southern California’s Pete Carroll, who are
believed to be the highest paid in the nation.69 Therefore, Miles
and LSU revamped that agreement and signed a five-year contract
which guarantees that “he will be paid no less than the highest-paid
coach at a public university in the conference, plus $1,000.”70
66

Id. “If Meyer gets bumped to, say, $4 million per year from Florida, LSU might
have to escalate Miles’ salary to $4.001 million—for five losses last season.” Id.
67
See Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1.
68
Id.
69
See Brett Martel, LSU’s Miles Signs New Contract, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2008-03-14-1205869527_x.htm; see
also Ranking Salaries of Head Football Coaches, supra note 12.
70
Martel, supra note 69. This agreement also guaranteed Miles $18.75 million if he is
fired without cause, which increased the previously agreed upon $15 million without
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What would compel LSU to agree to guarantee that Miles
would be the highest-paid coach in the conference for the ensuing
five years? LSU Board of Supervisors Chairman-elect Jim Roy
said, “It is what it is . . . . It’s a performance-based contract. The
man won a national championship.”71 But to the contrary, Miles’s
contract is not performance-based; the escalator clause applies
each year and effectively guarantees Miles a raise in compensation
during each of the remaining years of the term irrespective of the
team’s performance in those years. Another board member
commented, “When you look at the silliness that’s going on in
college athletics . . . it’s inevitable we’re looking at numbers that
seem out of perspective. But I think it’s the right number.”72
Presumably, this board member is referring to the right number as
the $3.751 million salary Miles earned the first year of the new
five-year deal when the team won the national title,73 because the
following year the team had a mediocre overall record of 8–5 (3–5
in the SEC) and was unranked in all of the polls at the completion
of the season.74 Former LSU Chancellor Sean O’Keefe said in
regards to the adjusted cost to keep Miles, “If that’s what
everybody considers reasonable, I congratulate him.”75 Notably,
because of the escalator clause in Miles’s contract, what constitutes
“reasonable” broke the $4 million mark beginning in 2009 with the
announcement of Urban Meyer’s new contract that pays him $4
million annually as well as Nick Saban’s contract at Alabama
providing for annual salaries of $4.1 million in 2010, $4.15 million
in 2011 and $4.2 million from 2012 to 2015.76
cause termination clause. Jordan Blum, Miles Could Get $3.75 Million,
2THEADVOCATE.COM, Mar. 15, 2008, http://www.2theadvocate.com/sports/lsu/1669
9056.html?showAll=y.
71
Blum, supra note 70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
73
See Martel, supra note 69 (“Miles will earn at least $3.75 million plus $1,000 a year
in a deal that nudges him ahead of Alabama coach Nick Saban and makes Miles one of
the nation’s top-paid college football coaches.”).
74
See Joey Johnston, Tigers Talented, but Have a Tough Road Ahead in Imposing SEC
West, NBCSPORTS.COM, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/19945677/ns/sportscollege_football/.
75
Blum, supra note 70 (internal quotations omitted).
76
See Adam Jones & Cecil Hurt, Saban’s Contract a Done Deal, TUSCALOOSA NEWS,
June 15, 2007, http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20070615/NEWS/706150345/
1007/APS.
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c) Kansas’s Bill Self
Within twenty-four hours after Kansas won the national
basketball championship in 2008, head coach Bill Self was already
discussing his contract situation—a contract that still had four
years remaining.77 Following the game, Self told reporters that he
would not rule out listening to an offer from Oklahoma State, a
competitor of Kansas in the Big 12 conference: “That’s my alma
mater . . . . I know people down there. But they haven’t contacted
me.”78 Although Self signed a five-year contract extension the
year before that increased his annual compensation to more than
$1.3 million with a chance to make another $350,000 each year if
he meets incentives,79 Self told ESPN that he still needed to talk to
Kansas Athletic Director Lew Perkins about his contract:
I want to visit with my athletic director . . . . To be
real honest with you, I love Kansas. I love my job
here, and hopefully it will be a situation where I can
spend a long time here. I’m certainly not looking to
leave, but Lew and I got to visit. I’m sure that’ll
happen in the next couple days.80
Four months later, it was announced that Kansas and Self
entered a $30 million, ten-year contract extension.81 According to
Perkins, the extension entailed minimal negotiation: “I wouldn’t
even use the word ‘negotiate.’ The entire process was positive
from day one. We didn’t squabble over anything.”82 Self
confirmed that:
When we first sat down to talk, Lew asked me,
“How many years do you want?” I said 10 and he
77

See Posting of Thayer Evans to The Quad, The New York Times Sports Blog, Self
Says He Wants to Stay, http://thequad.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/self-says-he-wantsto-stay/ (Aug. 8, 2008, 18:17 EST).
78
Self Wants to Stay at Kansas but Won’t Rule Out Talking to Alma Mater,
ESPN.COM, Apr. 8, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/ncaatourney08/news/story?
id=3335488 [hereinafter Self Wants to Stay at Kansas].
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See Associated Press, Self Signs New 10-Year, $30 Million Contract with Kansas,
USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/
big12/2008-08-06-self-kansas_N.htm.
82
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

C01_KARCHER_FINAL 12-30-09 (DO NOT DELETE)

20

12/30/2009 10:30:28 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 20:1

said, “Perfect, that’s what I had in mind. We’re
going to take care of you” . . . . There was no
negotiating on my part, either. I can’t think of any
place I’d rather work or live. . . .
....
. . . But getting the security is definitely a nice
thing. Our coaches and I are very happy about the
commitment the university has made to us. We
want to make a similar commitment back.83
However, Self’s commitment seems questionable when he also
told reporters, “But I’m looking at it as 10 one-year contracts.”84
Perhaps Self remains committed to Kansas so long as he remains
content with the level of guaranteed compensation each year.
d)

Texas Tech’s Mike Leach

In the 2008 football season, Texas Tech, under the leadership
of head coach Mike Leach, matched the school single-season
record for victories with an 11–2 record (7–1 in the conference),
including a loss in the 2009 Cotton Bowl Classic.85 The team has
been to nine bowl games during Leach’s nine-season tenure at
Texas Tech.86 Leach had two years left on his existing contract
and reports surfaced that Leach was apparently “willing to fulfill
the terms of the remaining two seasons under his current contract,”
but that Tech would not “go along with his desire because of the
potential for recruiting damage with a lame-duck coach during that
period.”87 Unlike the previous situations discussed, negotiations
over an extension between Texas Tech and Leach got contentious
regarding issues involving compensation and term: “what would
happen if Leach were fired” or quit or “interviewed for a new job
without the university’s permission,” and how money would be
83

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
See Brandon George, Leach Deal Gets Done Five-Year Agreement Reached After
Long, Intense Negotiations, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 20, 2009, at C6, available at
http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dws/spt/wfaa/stories/022009dnspotechlede.2fa7bb1
3.html.
86
Id.
87
Griffin, supra note 42.
84
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shared from “personal appearances and promotional activities.”88
Leach and Texas Tech ultimately signed a new $12.7 million, fiveyear contract.89 The Dallas Morning News compared the new
contract with the previous one:
 Leach’s new contract doesn’t have a buyout,
making him the fifth Big 12 coach without one.
Tech had wanted a $1.5 million buyout. His
previous contract had a $500,000 buyout.
 Leach’s new contract has a termination
guarantee of $400,000 for each season left or
about 16.5 percent of the entire deal. Tech had
proposed $300,000 for each season left. Leach’s
previous contract guaranteed him 40 percent left
of his remaining deal if he were to be terminated
without cause.
 Both sides agreed that Leach has to give Tech
“notification” if he were to interview for another
job, but he won’t be required to get Tech
Athletic Director Gerald Myers’ “permission” to
do so, as Tech had proposed. Leach also can’t
be penalized for interviewing elsewhere.
 Leach gets to maintain his personal property
rights, as he has in his previous contract, though
Tech and Leach agreed to share marketing
responsibilities for him . . .
 Tech also guaranteed Leach $400,000 more
annually to go toward his staff’s salary pool.90
e) Cincinnati’s Brian Kelly
In late 2006, the University of Cincinnati hired Brian Kelly
away from Central Michigan to fill its football head coaching
vacancy and guaranteed him about 62% more than it had paid its
88

Id.; see also George, supra note 85 (“After 10 months of fruitless talks that were
sometimes heated, Leach and Tech finally agreed Thursday to a contract extension that
will keep him in Lubbock through 2013.”).
89
See George, supra note 85.
90
Id.
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previous coach, Mark Dantonio, who was hired away by Michigan
State to fill its vacancy.91 The contract called for Kelly to make
$800,000 in 2007, almost 4.5 times the $185,000 Kelly made with
Central Michigan the previous year, and contained “built-in annual
increases of $50,000.”92 In Kelly’s first season with Cincinnati in
2007, the team finished with a 10–3 record (4–3 in the conference),
including a win in the PapaJohns.com Bowl.93 After the 2007
season, Kelly and Cincinnati agreed to a new five-year contract,
which voided the remaining four years on Kelly’s initial contract
and raised his guaranteed salary between $1.2 million and $1.35
million and included performance-based incentives.94 In Kelly’s
second season in 2008, the team finished with an 11–3 record (6–1
in the conference) and won the Big East Conference title “sending
them to the first BCS bowl in school history.”95 Once again,
following the 2008 season, the two sides immediately began to
discuss another extension that would add an additional year to the
agreement and give Kelly another raise in guaranteed
compensation.96 Cincinnati ultimately rewarded Kelly with a
contract extension that gave him an additional year and raised his
salary to $1.475 million, and included performance-based
incentives and increases in the salaries of his assistant coaches as
91

Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1.
Id.
93
See Joel Welser, 2008 Cincinnati Bearcats Football Preview, COLLEGESPORTSFANS.COM, http://www.collegesports-fans.com/football-previews/2008-ncaafbs/cincinnati-bearcats-preview.html.
94
See Associated Press, Kelly Agrees to Terms on New Contract with No. 20
Cincinnati, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/
football/2007-12-17-757914779_x.htm.
95
Associated Press, Kelly Says He is Planning on Staying at Cincinnati, USA TODAY,
Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigeast/2008-12-02cincinnati-kelly_n.htm. In response to a question about his plans on staying at
Cincinnati, Kelly responded:
All I can say is that with all the speculation and all the jobs that have
been out there, sooner or later “no” means “no.” . . . Again, no one
can ever speak in terms of forever and ever, but what I can tell you is
there’s been a lot of interest in my services, and I want to be here at
the University of Cincinnati because of the right reasons.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
96
See Brian Bennett, Cincinnati, Kelly Close in on New Deal, ESPN.COM, June 2,
2009, http://myespn.go.com/blogs/bigeast/0-5-4/Cincinnati--Kelly-close-in-on-newdeal.html.
92
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well.97 Regarding this most recent extension, one reporter raised
an excellent question: “It’s a fitting reward for Kelly. The question
is, however, if a big-name program comes calling on Kelly after
this season, will the contract actually mean anything?”98
2. Buyouts: The Cost of Replacing an Unsuccessful Coach
When a new coach is hired to fill a vacancy, unless the former
coach retired, the vacancy usually arises because the former coach
either (a) voluntarily left for greener pastures to coach at a
different school, or (b) was terminated. Because college coaches
are not at-will employees, a termination by the school “without
cause” (for reason other than a breach or violation committed by
the coach)99 entitles the coach to compensation, or damages, in
accordance with the terms of the contract.100 Unfortunately for the
school, when a coach is terminated for not winning, it constitutes a
termination without cause.101 What is typically referred to in most
industries as severance pay, the compensation paid to the former
coach under these circumstances is commonly known in the

97
See Associated Press, Cincinnati Coach Kelly Gets Extension Through 2013, USA
TODAY, June 22, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigeast/200906-22-cincinati-kelly_N.htm.
98
Bennett, supra note 96.
99
Some of the typical termination “with cause” provisions in coaches’ contracts
include the commission of a material breach by the coach, the commission of a felony or
crime of moral turpitude, and serious or material violation of NCAA bylaws. For a
discussion of typical “with cause” termination provisions in college coaches’ contracts,
see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 209–13.
100
“[W]hen the coach is terminated without cause, the issue centers on the
determination of the amount of damages that the coach will receive, the nature of the
damages, and the method of payment.” Id. at 226; see also Libby Sander & Paul Fain,
Coaches’ Contracts Are Fertile Ground for Conflict, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash.,
D.C.), June 12, 2009, at A1, available at http://chronicle.com/article/coaches-contractsare-fertile/44424/ (“In most cases, if a university fires a coach with cause—that is, for a
specific reason spelled out in the terms of a contract—it does not have to pay a dime. But
terminating a coach for no reason often triggers payments, and those details are usually
worked out in a contract.”).
101
See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 226 (“[T]ermination without cause is usually based
upon the coach’s win-loss record, failure to beat a conference opponent, failure to obtain
post-season invitations or appearances, attendance, lack of attendance, loss of favor with
boosters, program elimination or financial exigency.”).
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college coaching industry as a “buyout.”102 The amount of the
buyout is typically tied to the number of years remaining on the
term of the contract at the time the coach is terminated.103 Thus,
the earlier in the term that a coach is terminated, the costlier it is
for the school. Buyouts are, in essence, an additional cost to
schools for keeping coaches on contract that are no longer working
for them.104
Four recent terminations (or forced resignations) in college
football during mid-season in 2008, and one at the end of the 2008
season, demonstrate just how costly buyouts can be. Washington
terminated Tyrone Willingham in mid-season two days after the
team fell to a record of 0–7.105 With one year remaining on his
102

Steve Wieberg, Huge Buyouts for College Coaches Causing Concern, USA TODAY,
Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2008-11-06-coachesbuyouts_N.htm [hereinafter Wieberg, Huge Buyouts].
103
A number of options are available, including:
1. A negotiated stated amount.
2. The coach’s base salary or other compensation items for the
remainder of the contract term.
3. The percentage of the base salary and other compensation
packages for the remainder of the agreement.
4. De-escalating amount depending upon the year of the agreement
and the termination therefor.
5. A lump sum settlement.
Greenberg, supra note 5, at 226 (citing Kevin Stangel, Comment, Protecting
Universities’ Economic Interests: Holding Student-Athletes and Coaches Accountable for
Willful Violations of NCAA Rules, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 137, 154 (2000)).
104
As noted by Dutch Baughman, who heads the Texas-based Division I-A Athletic
Directors’ Association:
Not only do you have these buyouts, these immediate expenses—
what it’s going to cost you to keep coaches on contract who are no
longer actually working for you? . . . You’ve got all the new
(coaches’) contracts, all the moving expenses, all the other start-up
costs of a whole new staff coming in.
Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Iliana Limón, Part 4: Come on Down: College Football Coaches Still Lining Up for
Rising Pay, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 29, 2009, at C1 (“The big salaries don’t stop when
a coach is fired. Numerous schools are still paying coaches buyouts to coaches they’re
now paying not to coach.”).
105
Willingham to Step Down as Huskies Coach at Season’s End, ESPN.COM, Oct. 28,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3667258. Washington Athletic
Director Scott Woodward said, “It became quite obvious with the performance on the
football field it wasn’t up to what we talked about at the beginning of the season and
previous to the season.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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contract at the time he left, Washington owed him a buyout of
$1,000,000.106
Three football coaches—Clemson’s Tommy
Bowden, Kansas State’s Ron Prince, and Tennessee’s Phillip
Fulmer —were terminated mid-season during the first year of new
contracts.107 Bowden stepped down after starting the first season
of a new six year contract extension with a 3–3 record, and he was
paid his salary through the end of the season in addition to a $3.5
million buyout that was owed under the terms of his contract.108
Kansas State’s decision to fire Prince was made mid-season after
the team fell to a 4–5 record and a 52–21 loss to Kansas one week
earlier.109 Prince was terminated in the first year of a five-year
contract extension that was agreed to just prior to the
commencement of the season.110 Prince coached the team for the
remainder of the season and was owed “a $1.2 million buyout plus
a prorated, $150,000 longevity bonus.”111 Fulmer was terminated
during the first season of a seven-year contract extension in which
he is owed a $6 million buyout payable over 48 months.112
106

Id.; see also Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102.
See Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102.
108
Associated Press, Clemson’s Bowden Steps Down, SI.COM, Oct. 13, 2008,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/football/ncaa/10/13/clemson.bowden.resigns/index.
html.
109
See Tim Griffin, Prince Won’t Return as Kansas State’s Football Coach in 2009,
ESPN.COM, Nov. 6, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3684640. Kansas
State Athletic Director Bob Krause indicated that the loss to Kansas contributed to the
disappointment in Prince’s job performance: “I think, in all honesty, that coming into the
game, the buildup was there that there was a significant expectation that we would expect
to win . . . . That certainly is a factor.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110
See Kansas State University, Prince Agrees to New Five-Year Contract, KSTATESPORTS.COM, Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.kstatesports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?
SPSID=3065&SPID=212&DB_OEM_ID=400&ATCLID=1551188.
111
Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102. In the months following Prince’s
termination, Kansas State officials discovered a “secret” deferred-compensation
agreement, signed by the former athletic director months before Prince was fired, that
would pay Prince $3.2 million and would be funneled to a limited-liability corporation
formed by Prince. See Sander & Fain, supra note 100. Kansas State filed a lawsuit
challenging the validity of that agreement. Id.
112
Chris Low, Fulmer Agrees to Step Aside as Vols Coach at End of Season,
ESPN.COM, Nov. 4, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3679810; see also
Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102 (according to USA Today’s Steve Wieberg, in
addition to the buyout owed Fulmer, Tennessee would pay “Fulmer’s assistants if they’re
also let go: two years’ pay for coordinators and one year’s pay for the others[,]” totaling
$1.935 million in salaries).
107
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Finally, Auburn’s Tommy Tuberville resigned at the end of the
2008 season in which the team finished with a 5–7 record, and
Auburn agreed to pay him the $5.08 million buyout that was owed
pursuant to the terms of his contract (that went through 2013) if he
was fired.113 These five terminations in one football season left the
five schools owing a combined $16.9 million to their former
coaches in buyout obligations alone.114
In April of 2009, the University of Kentucky hired John
Calipari away from Memphis and signed him to an eight-year,
$31.65 million contract, making him the highest-paid college
basketball coach in the nation.115 Calipari filled a vacancy that was
left following the dismissal of Billy Gillispie, who went 40–27 in
two seasons at Kentucky and did not get Kentucky a seat in the
NCAA tournament for the first time since 1991.116 Gillispie was
working under a memorandum of understanding, which was signed
when he was hired in 2007 and contemplated a seven-year term,
because he had not signed a formal contract during the two years
he coached at Kentucky.117 Gillispie and Kentucky both filed
lawsuits over whether a buyout clause in the two-page
memorandum, which would pay Gillispie $6 million, is binding.118
If Gillispie prevails in his lawsuit, with Calipari’s salary, Kentucky
113

See Associated Press, Despite Tuberville Quitting, Auburn Will Pay Buyout,
ESPN.COM, Dec. 11, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3763601; see
also Update: Auburn’s Tommy Tuberville Resigns, NBC13.COM, Dec. 3, 2008,
http://www2.nbc13.com/vtm/sports/college/auburn/article/tommy_tuberville_resigns_as_
auburn_coach/49416/.
114
See supra notes 105–13 and accompanying text.
115
See Michael Smith, TV Money Arriving Just in Time for Kentucky, Calipari, STREET
& SMITH’S SPORTSBUS. J., Apr. 6, 2009,
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/
62131; see also Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3.
116
See Associated Press, Gillispie Regrets Not Winning More, ESPN.COM, Mar. 31,
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=4023318.
117
See Associated Press, Kentucky, Gillispie Exchange Lawsuits Over Termination,
USA TODAY, May 29, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/
sec/2009-05-28-kentucky-gillispie_N.htm?csp=34.
118
See id. Kentucky’s lawsuit states,
UK’s lawyers are asking the court to rule that the two-page
memorandum of understanding Gillispie signed after his hiring in
2007 was not the equivalent of a full contract. Gillispie says it is and
that he is entitled to $1.5 million a year for four of the five years left
on the deal.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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will have paid in excess of $37 million over eight years for their
new coach—a steep price to pay for a basketball program that
generates approximately $15 million annually in revenue.119
C. The University’s Return on Investment: Reward vs. Risk
1. The Reward
Schools justify the large financial commitments to their
football and basketball head coaches on the basis that a coach’s
compensation is an investment that yields a monetary return. For
example, when University of Florida President Bernie Machen told
the Orlando Sentinel that Urban Meyer should be the highest-paid
coach in the Southeastern Conference, he referred to Meyer’s
compensation as an investment:
Especially in a dynamic business like athletics, you
invest a lot of resources and time in something . . . .
It may not pay off for 3 or 4 or 5 years, but if you
stop, then it’s just going to slow you down . . . . I
really believe No. 1, we’ve got the best athletics
program in the country.120
The expected return on that investment can take the form of
increased ticket sales, marketing and sponsorship revenue,
donations, and even admissions applications.121 Additionally, if
there is a surplus in revenue, some athletic departments will help
fund their school’s academic programs.122
The expected high return on investment is evident in the recent
hiring of two coaches towards the high-end of the pay scale in
football and basketball, Alabama’s Nick Saban and Kentucky’s
John Calipari. In early 2007, Alabama hired Nick Saban away

119

See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20.
Fowler, supra note 59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121
See Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1 (“It’s an investment, school
officials say, in the health of a sport that’s the revenue-generating backbone of most
major-college athletics programs. Successful teams pump up ticket sales and prices,
television rights fees, marketing revenue, donations and even applications for admission
to the universities.”).
122
See infra text accompanying notes 152–55.
120
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from the Miami Dolphins.123 Saban and his agent “negotiated an
eight-year, $32 million contract that was, at the time, the highest
salary ever paid to a college coach. It remains among the highest”
and is even larger than most NFL coaching salaries.124 Alabama
President Robert Witt told the Board of Trustees, “We believe this
contract serves the university well . . . . It represents a sound
business decision.”125 The Chairman of the Board of Trustees said,
“As a board, we feel we have made a wise and good
investment.”126 Monte Burke of Forbes Magazine highlighted
some of the areas of “return on investment” to Alabama as a result
of the hire, from both an athletic and academic standpoint:


92,000 fans attended Saban’s first spring
practice game.127



The waiting list for season tickets tripled
following Saban’s arrival.128
The football program had an estimated $32
million profit the year following Saban’s arrival,
which was being used to pay off the athletic
department’s $130 million debt incurred for
capital improvements.
Alabama’s football
program finances 77% of Alabama’s entire
athletic department as well as some academic
programs.129





123

With regard to the school’s recent $500 million
capital campaign, Alabama’s president Robert
Witt said, “We have had a 100,000 donors in
that campaign, and a major reason they support
us is football.”130

Burke, supra note 30.
Id. Nick Saban’s contract with Alabama includes, “among other perks, 25 hours of
private use of a university airplane, two cars and country club membership.” Id.
125
Jones & Hurt, supra note 76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126
Id.
127
Burke, supra note 30.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
124
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Regarding student enrollment, Witt said,
“Having a coach of his caliber makes it easier to
recruit better students and raise more money.”
For example, enrollment of students in the top
quarter of their high school class increased from
54% in 2007 to 57% in 2008.131
Saban’s 2008 recruiting class was the consensus
number one in the country. Saban also had toprated recruiting classes in three of his five years
as head coach at Louisiana State where he won
two conference championships and a national
title before taking the job with the Dolphins in
2005.132

Kentucky recently established a new high mark in basketball
coaches’ compensation when it signed Calipari to an eight-year,
$31.65 million contract.133 In the first year of the contract, he will
make approximately $1 million more than the previous coach at
Kentucky, Billy Gillispie, would have made that year had he not
been fired.134 “Calipari is guaranteed $3.7 million [in the first
year], then $3.8 million annually through the 2013–14 season and
$3.25 million a year for the remainder of the agreement through
2016–17.”135 It remains to be seen over the ensuing three or four
years what kind of return Kentucky will ultimately receive on its
investment in Calipari, but Kentucky has high expectations that the
hiring of Calipari will generate more revenues. In defending the
contract, Kentucky Athletic Director Mitch Barnhart said, “If done
correctly, the investment in a coach will pay for itself and yield
returns for the overall program in general.”136 According to Tom

131

Id.
Id.; see also Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game, supra note 1 (“At LSU, a football
team that finished 11–2 and ranked No. 3 in 2006 accounted for 63% of the school’s
athletics revenue for the year. It also accounted for a lion’s share of the spending—more
than $16 million—but turned an almost $32 million profit that helped underwrite the
school’s non-moneymaking sports.”).
133
Smith, supra note 115; see also Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3.
134
Smith, supra note 115.
135
Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3.
136
Id.
132
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Stultz, IMG College’s Senior Vice President and General
Manager:
A marketable head coach affects how people feel
about the program. . . . If the perception among the
fans is that coach Calipari will return the program to
national prominence, the value of that fan affinity in
the eyes of sponsors goes up. The fan base is more
inclined to embrace the products and the sponsors
that support the school.
....
. . . You think about sponsors, donor contributions,
the pressure on ticket sales, premium seating,
merchandise sales. It all goes up or down based on
how the team is doing. Paying a good coach will
fund itself in extra revenues.137
How are the large investments in Saban and Calipari funded?
According to Alabama President Robert Witt, none of Saban’s
compensation is funded by students or taxpayers but is paid
entirely from athletic department revenue, which includes
broadcasting fees, sponsorships, booster donations, ticket sales,
and shoe and apparel endorsements.138 Calipari’s compensation is
also supported by the athletic department budget.139 For example,
Kentucky will pay Calipari with additional television revenue
flowing from new contracts the conference entered into with CBS
and ESPN that commence with the 2010 season and will pay the
conference an average of $205 million annually, representing a
projected revenue boost of approximately $5 million to each
school in the conference.140 Kentucky will also receive additional
revenues from an escalating marketing and media rights agreement
it has with IMG College that guarantees Kentucky $7.8 million in
2009 and $8 million in 2010.141 According to one source,
137

Smith, supra note 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Burke, supra note 30.
139
See infra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
140
Smith, supra note 115.
141
Id. Kentucky is not the only school funding coaches’ salaries with additional
revenue from new broadcast and marketing deals. For example, Georgia will use part of
the revenue generated from the new SEC television deal and its new
138
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Kentucky’s basketball program “generates more than $20 million
of [Kentucky’s] $70 million budget.”142
Although most athletic departments operate under their
university’s administrative umbrella, “Florida’s athletic
department . . . operates as a separate nonprofit organization that
funds itself.”143
Florida’s Athletic Director Jeremy Foley
elaborated:
It was set up as a private corporation, the underlying
philosophy being money that could be used for
academics would not be used for athletics. . . .
That’s the way it always has been. We receive no
money from the university. We generate our own
dollars.144
The athletic association is well-positioned financially,
producing revenue in excess of $106 million before expenses of
$98 million during the 2007–08 fiscal year.145 Like most major
athletic programs, Florida’s primary revenue sources consist of
booster contributions, ticket sales, licensing and marketing
agreements, and broadcast deals.146 At Florida, winning has
generated more revenue. For example, Florida’s 2007 BCS
National Championship Game “created windfalls from
merchandise sales and booster donations.”147 Donations from

marketing/multimedia deal with ISP Sports to help fund coaches’ salaries that increased
from the previous year. See Tim Tucker, Georgia’s Athletics Budget in Good Shape,
ATLANTA J. CONST., June 28, 2009, at 1C, available at http://www.ajc.com/uga/content/
sports/uga/stories/2009/06/28/georgia_athletics_budget.html.
142
Smith, supra note 115.
143
Joey Johnston & Mick Elliot, Gators: Bank on Winning Ways, TAMPA TRIB., June 7,
2009, at 1. Florida’s rival, the University of Georgia, operates its athletics department in
a similar manner with a self-supporting, separate fiscal entity apart from the university.
See Tucker, supra note 141.
144
Johnston & Elliot, supra note 143 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145
Id.
146
Id. Florida athletics “receive[] a membership share of television-contract money
paid to the Southeastern Conference, and [in 2008,] signed a 10-year, $100 million deal
with Sun Sports and its partner, sports marketing company IMG,” which generates
revenue for broadcast rights and advertising at athletic venues. Id. Florida athletics will
receive $25 million annually for fifteen years under the Sun Sports agreement and the
SEC’s broadcast agreements with ESPN and CBS. Id.
147
Id.
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boosters and other sources produced $3.6 million in the 2005–06
fiscal year and jumped to $8.6 million the next year (an increase of
138.9 %).148 In addition, Florida athletics experienced a $4.1
million increase in merchandise sales and licensing income after
winning the 2007 football title, which decreased by $2.4 million
the following year.149 Florida’s $106 million in revenue for the
2007–08 fiscal year was the third highest among all college athletic
programs behind Texas and Ohio State.150
New marketing and broadcast deals are generating more
revenue for athletic departments, and as a result, more schools are
seeing a surplus in revenue.151 Operating surpluses in athletics can
help fund academics. For example, according to The Tampa
Tribune, since 1990, Florida’s athletic association has made annual
contributions to the university totaling in excess of $48 million,
including a contribution in excess of $9.5 million in 2007.152
Oklahoma’s athletic department makes annual contributions of at
least $1 million to the university’s academic programs, and in
2009, it increased financial assistance by $3 million to help the
university avoid tuition increases for students and layoffs of
faculty and staff.153 The athletic departments at Arkansas and
South Carolina recently made million-dollar contributions to their
schools’ academic programs in 2009 as well.154 Additionally, as a
148

Id.
Id.
150
See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20.
151
See supra notes 141 and 146; see also Seth Emerson, USC Funds Up Even as
Football Ticket Sales Dip, STATE, June 12, 2009, available at http://www.thestate.com/
gogamecocks/story/823288.html (noting that South Carolina’s athletics department is
projecting a $1 million increase in its surplus for the 2009–10 fiscal year, despite an
anticipated drop in football season-ticket sales and club memberships, in large part due to
the SEC’s new 15-year television deal with ESPN); Tucker, supra note 141 (“Georgia
expects an increase of about $8.5 million in athletics revenue, almost $7 million of it
from the SEC’s new TV deal and UGA’s new marketing and multimedia deal.”);
Michigan Athletic Department FY 2010 (June 18, 2009), http://annarborchronicle.com/
wp-content/uploads/2009/06/fy-2010-athletic-budget-presentaiton.pdf (projecting that
Michigan’s athletic department, in its ninth straight year of operating surpluses, will have
a $9 million surplus for fiscal year 2010).
152
See Johnston & Elliot, supra note 143.
153
Tim Griffin, Sooner Athletics Gives an Additional $3 Million, ESPN.COM, June 24,
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4284416.
154
Id.
149
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result of a reduction in state funding at the University of Georgia,
its athletic department will contribute $2 million each of the next
three years to support academic programs.155
2. The Risk
Focusing on the potential reward from making such a large
investment in a coach may convince one to conclude that a highlycompensated coach is more likely to result in a successful
program, which will lead to a surplus in revenue.156 But as is the
case with any investment, risk follows potential reward. In bigtime intercollegiate athletics, the risk to a school making a
significant investment in a coach is that the investment does not
result in a successful program. A few recent studies have shown
that there is a tenuous connection between coaches’ salaries and
winning.
A report released in 2009, based upon a study commissioned
by the NCAA that evaluated overall athletic department spending
and win-loss records over the three-year period from 2004–07,
revealed that there is a significant relationship between winning

155

Tucker, supra note 141.
See supra text accompanying note 137; see also Mary Morgan, UM FY10 = Tuition
Hike + Financial Aid, ANN ARBOR CHRON., http://annarborchronicle.com/2009/06/21/
um-fy10-tuition-hike-financial-aid/ (“UM is one of only a handful of universities with a
self-sustaining athletic department.”). But see Wieberg & Upton, The Money Game,
supra note 1 (“Not all athletics departments are self-supporting, however. The NCAA’s
latest data shows that more than four of every five major-college sports programs need
institutional subsidies, student fees and other supplements to balance their budgets.”);
Mark Alesia, Colleges Play, Public Pays, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 30, 2006, at A1,
available at http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/99999999/SPORTS06/
399990029/1216/LOCAL08 (“Athletic departments at taxpayer-funded universities
nationwide receive more than $1 billion in student fees and general school funds and
services, according to an Indianapolis Star analysis of the 2004–05 athletic budgets of
164 of the nation’s 215 largest public schools. Without such outside funding, fewer than
10 percent of athletic departments would have been able to support themselves with
ticket sales, television contracts and other revenue-generating sports sources.”); Steve
Wieberg & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Report:
College Sports Spending Keeps
Skyrocketing, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
college/2009-04-29-college-athletic-spending-report_N.htm [hereinafter Wieberg &
Berkowitz, NCAA Report] (“All but about two dozen of the 120 athletics programs in the
Bowl Subdivision are subsidized to some degree by their respective schools.”).
156
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and total program expenditures.157 For example, the study
estimates that “[a]n extra $1 million spent on football increases
winning percentage by 1.8 percentage points and the chances of a
top 25 finish in the Associated Press media poll by 5 percentage
points,” which results in extra revenue of approximately $3 million
(not including revenue generated from bowl game appearances).158
However, the authors of the report noted that team expenditures,
such as recruiting, equipment and other “game-day expenses” are
the only category of spending with a statistically significant effect
on performance.159 According to “[c]o-author Jonathan Orszag, an
economist who once served on President Clinton’s National
Economic Council and as assistant to the Secretary of Commerce,”
although there are exceptions, in the aggregate, “big salaries for
coaches [do not] prove to be sound investments.”160
Forbes Magazine completed a study in 2008 comparing the
highest-paid football coaches with their win-loss records using a
metric that compared a coach’s 2007 salary with his team’s
performance over the previous three-year period covering the
2005, 2006 and 2007 seasons, with bonus points given for winning
any of the five prestigious BCS bowl games.161 The study was
limited to coaches from schools in the six major conferences,162
which “accounted for 87% of total college football revenue, as
157

See Wieberg & Berkowitz, NCAA Report, supra note 156.
Id. In basketball, the study similarly concluded that there was a distinct correlation
between non-salary expenditures and both winning percentage and the probability of
reaching the NCAA tournament. Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. (“There’s a lot of pressure on university presidents to hire an expensive coach, . .
. but the evidence suggests that spending more on coaches does not bring the benefit to
the university that they expect.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jonathan
Orszag)).
161
See Schwartz, The Best (and Worst), supra note 7. In addition to base pay, salary
figures used in the study included: (1) income guaranteed from media and apparel deals,
speaking fees and football camps; (2) performance bonuses received during the 2007
season for bowl game appearances and high national rankings; and (3) expense accounts
and estimated value of perks such as use of cars and private airplanes, golf club
memberships, etc. Id.
162
Atlantic Coast Conference, Big East Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big 12
Conference, Pac 10 Conference and Southeastern Conference. CBSSports.com,
Comparing Major Conferences’ OOC Schedules, http://www.cbssports.com/mcc/
messages/chrono/15354081 (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
158
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well as independent . . . Notre Dame.”163 According to Forbes
Magazine, the five most underpaid coaches with successful
football programs were as follows:
 Ohio State’s Jim Tressel, whose $2.6 million
salary was less than eight other coaches despite
a 33–5 record (1–2 in BCS bowl games),164
including appearances in the 2007 and 2008
BCS National Championship Games;165
 Oregon State’s Mike Riley, who had a 24–14
record (2–0 in bowl games) and earned $1.1
million;166
 Wake Forest’s Jim Grobe, who also had a 24–14
record (2–0 in bowl games; 0–1 in BCS bowl
games) and signed an extension for a relatively
low $1.2 million after he took the team to its
first BCS Orange Bowl Game;167
 Southern California’s Pete Carroll, whose 34–5
record (2–1 in BCS bowl games) made him the
highest paid at $4.4 million;168 and
 Virginia Tech’s Frank Beamer, who had a 32–8
record (1–2 in bowl games; 0–1 in BCS bowl
games) and earned $2.1 million.169
Interestingly, just two weeks after Forbes Magazine published
this list, Ohio State announced that Tressel’s annual salary would
be immediately raised from an average of $2.6 million to an
average of $3.5 million, which automatically made him the highest
163

Schwartz, The Best (and Worst), supra note 7.
Peter J. Schwartz, In Pictures: The Best (and Worst) College Football Coaches for
the Buck, FORBES.COM, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/13/footballcarroll-tressel-biz-sports-cz_pjs_0813coaches_slide.html [hereinafter Schwartz, In
Pictures].
165
See ESPN.com, Flynn Leads LSU With 4 TDs As Tigers Extend Buckeyes’ SEC
Troubles, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/recap?gameId=280070194 (last visited Oct. 17,
2009).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
164
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paid football coach in the Big Ten conference.170 According to
Ohio State Athletic Director Gene Smith, Tressel “was not the No.
1 (paid) coach in the conference. The big thing for me was, ‘How
can we sit here and not be fair to him?’ We have the No. 1 coach
in the conference, period. Why wouldn’t we recognize that?”171
Even more indicative of the tenuous relationship that exists
between winning and high coaching salaries is Forbes Magazine’s
list of the five most overpaid coaches with unsuccessful football
programs:




170

Iowa’s Kirk Ferentz, who had a $3.4 million
salary with a 19–18 record (1–2 in bowl
games);172
Syracuse’s Greg Robinson, who had a 7–28
record with a $1.1 million salary;173



Notre Dame’s Charlie Weis, who had a 22–15
record (0–2 in BCS bowl games), and his 3-win
season in 2007 was the second year of a 10-year
contract extension reportedly worth between
$30 and $40 million;174



Maryland’s Ralph Friedgen, who earned $1.8
million with a 20–17 record (1–1 in bowl
games) and a win percentage that dropped by

Gordon, supra note 11.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ohio State University President E. Gordon
Gee emphasized:
I honestly think Jim Tressel is so committed to our program that we
could not raise his salary, not extend his contract, and he’d stay and
be loyal. . . . But that’s all the more reason to recognize someone.
You don’t take advantage of someone; you take advantage of what
you have because of him.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
172
Schwartz, In Pictures, supra note 164. In July of 2009, Ferentz signed a seven-year
contract extension with the Hawkeyes through the 2015 football season. Associated
Press, Kirk Ferentz Signs New Seven-Year Deal at Iowa, USA TODAY, July 20, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigten/2009-07-20-iowa-ferentzcontract_N.htm.
173
Schwartz, In Pictures, supra note 164.
174
Id.
171
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35% since signing a new contract in 2004;175
and


Virginia’s Al Groh, who had a 21–16 record (1–
1 in bowl games) with a $2 million salary.176
The top three most overpaid coaches on Forbes Magazine’s
list—Ferentz, Robinson and Weis—are also coaches at schools
that are listed among the top ten schools that paid the most coach’s
salary per win during the 2007 football season:177

175

Id.
Id.
177
Id.; Rank That Coach!, Dollars Per Win, http://rankthatcoach.com/blog/dollars-perwin/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
176
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Coach

School

Salary

Wins $ Per Win

1.Charlie
Weiss

Notre
Dame

$3,500,000

3

$1,166,666.67

2.Tim
Brewster

Minnesota

$1,000,000

1

$1,000,000.00

3.Nick
Saban

Alabama

$3,500,000

6

$583,333.33

4.Greg
Robinson

Syracuse

$1,000,000

2

$500,000.00

5.Phil
Bennett

SMU

$495,602

1

$495,602.00

6.Kirk
Ferentz

Iowa

$2,840,000

6

$473,333.33

7.Butch
Davis

North
Carolina

$1,800,000

4

$450,000.00

8.Guy
Morriss

Baylor

$1,144,236

3

$381,412.00

9.Ted Roof

Duke

$370,200

1

$370,200.00

10.Gene
Chizik

Iowa State

$1,100,000

3

$366,666.67

Perhaps the real impetus for the rise in coaching salaries in bigtime intercollegiate athletics may be attributed to the desire to win
and a perception among college administrators that only a small
handful of coaches in the marketplace are capable of doing that.
Whether that perception is accurate is irrelevant because, as the old
adage goes, “perception is reality.” In basic economic terminology
it equates to limited supply and high demand, which causes an
increase in price. However, the above data indicates that winning
is not a reflection of a coach’s salary. Nevertheless, in an effort to
do whatever it takes to succeed, schools that generate the revenue
to support large coaching salaries will continue to chase the carrot
by luring coaches from their competitors with even greater
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compensation, thus creating a unique leverage dynamic between
college football and basketball coaches’ contracts. In regards to
this leverage dynamic, one commentator noted that “[b]y
definition, each coach’s compensation level is ‘the market.’
Therefore, if any contract pushes the envelope, it immediately
establishes a new grid for negotiation.”178
D. The Leverage of Highly Successful Coaches
Successful college coaches have tremendous leverage in the
hiring and contract negotiation process. While revenue generation
and the desire to win discussed in the previous sections may, in
part, provide an explanation for why that leverage exists, they
certainly do not tell the complete story. This Section will address
the various factors (in no particular order of priority) contributing
to the leverage of successful college coaches, including why they
have greater leverage than even coaches in the professional ranks.
1. Timing Pressures, Agents and the Media
“What I think happens is the fact that, gee, we lost our
coach . . . and so we’ve got to get someone the next day, and so we
panic.”179
—Ohio State President, E. Gordon Gee
A small window of opportunity exists during the peak hiring
seasons in football and men’s basketball in which athletic directors
with coaching vacancies scramble to hire their first choice for the
job. The peak hiring season in football is from the end of the
season in late December to early January, and for men’s basketball,
it is the end of the season in late March to early April.180 Timing is
everything, and “[a]n athletic director who can’t make an offer
right away can lose his top prospect in an instant.”181 Some
commentators say this pace makes many athletic department
178
Dienhart, supra note 9 (“[C]ollege football may have a $5 million–$6 million per
year coach in the next few seasons.”).
179
Sander & Fain, supra note 100 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ohio
State President, E. Gordon Gee).
180
Id.
181
Id.
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administrators nervous and, in the words of Ohio State University
President Gordon Gee, leads to “panic.”182 According to Raymond
D. Cotton, a Washington-based lawyer who specializes in
presidents’ compensation, “The panic leads to overpaying and lack
of adequate negotiations,” and “leaves the university exposed.”183
Moreover, he says it is a “ludicrous” process and one that is not
appropriate for higher education.184
The pressure to quickly get a coach signed for fear of losing
him to a competitor school if a deal does not get done gives the
coach an advantage over the school in the negotiation process. As
is the case in any negotiation, unless the school is willing to walk
away from the deal, the school is likely to accede to the coach’s
demands. Moreover, in an effort to lock up the coach before the
media gets hold of it and announces the hiring, the school quickly
hammers out a short memorandum of understanding that outlines
the material terms, such as length of term, compensation and
buyout amounts, in contemplation that a detailed employment
agreement will soon be negotiated and signed in the ensuing
months.185 As a result of this pressure, the school is “caught
between a rock and a hard place” in at least two respects. First,
today’s 24-hour news cycle makes it very difficult for schools to
keep their search process confidential, and once it is reported that
the school and coach are having discussions, the school would be
hard-pressed to explain that it passed on its first choice because an
agreement could not be reached with the coach on the material
terms of employment. Arizona Athletic Director Jim Livengood,
who swiftly hired a new basketball coach recently, is “well aware
that athletic directors and university lawyers need to have the
tough conversations early on, even at the risk of throwing a wet
blanket on the hopeful tone of a new coaching regime.”186 Second,
once the coach has signed a memorandum of understanding and
begins working, the coach tends to have more leverage in
negotiating the employment agreement because, although the
182
183
184
185
186

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
Id.
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memorandum locks in both the school and the coach, from a
practical standpoint, the school is not going to allow the outcome
to be dictated by a dispute over terms to be included in an
employment agreement.187
The expansion of the coaching marketplace expands the role of
agents working on behalf of coaches, who can chart the coach’s
career and seek out potential opportunities and offers.188 The
proliferation of coaches’ agents in recent years has clearly had an
impact on the demands of coaches during the hiring process, which
has contributed to the rise in salaries.189 Agents are well-prepared
and are well aware of the salaries of other coaches.190 By virtue of
the fact that a relatively small number of agents represent the high
profile coaches, an agent can easily justify to an athletic director
what the market should pay.191 Most agents operate on a
commission basis,192 giving agents an incentive to drive up salaries
even more. Thus, an agent who negotiates a $3,000,000 annual
salary for a coach receives $90,000 to $120,000 in commission,
annually, for the life of that contract. Libby Sander and Paul Fain
of The Chronicle of Higher Education noted that, “As coaches

187

But see, e.g., UK Athletics Files Suit in Response to Gillispie, SPORTS NETWORK,
May 20, 2009, http://www.sportsnetwork.com/merge/tsnform.aspx?c=sportsnetwork
&page=cbask/news/newstest.aspx?id=4234270 (“Until the firing, neither side could agree
to an actual contract due to disputes over deferred compensation and how to define
‘termination without cause.’”).
188
Robert H. Lattinville & Robert A. Boland, Coaching in the National Football
League: A Market Survey and Legal Review, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 121 (2006).
189
See Brian Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part II: Agents Playing an Ever Greater Role in
the Hiring of College Coaches, CSTV.COM, Jan. 30, 2008,
http://www.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/stories/013008aag.html [hereinafter Curtis, The
Kingmakers: Part II]. As noted by one prominent agent, Jimmy Sexton, “Agents are
relatively new, especially in sports, [and] coaching agents are an even more recent
change, just in the last five to 10 years.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
190
Id. (“One clear success in recent years for coaching representatives has been the
driving up of salaries. . . . And they will tell you that one of the reasons for their
successes in negotiations is that they come prepared. They know what the market should
pay and they know what other coaches are making.”).
191
Id. Agents also keep abreast of the market via the Freedom of Information Act,
which requires public universities to make copies of their coaches’ contracts available to
the public upon request. Id.
192
See, e.g., id.
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demand bigger compensation deals, one question looms: Are
university lawyers outmatched?”193 Sander and Fain elaborated:
It is extremely rare for universities to use
outside lawyers to handle their contract
negotiations. Most large public universities that
stand to face serious scrutiny during the hiring
process have large legal staffs accustomed to the
various moving parts of a university and familiar
with its culture and mind-set.
But these lawyers also shoulder a heavy
workload in many other areas. Their top priority is
not to draw up coaches’ contracts and haggle over
how many courtesy cars a coach gets.
Given the workloads of many university lawyers
and the hardball nature of contract negotiations,
some in college sports think universities may have
to turn to outside help.194
Rather than hire outside legal help, the trend at an
overwhelming majority of schools is to hire an outside consultant
or headhunter that specializes in collegiate athletics to help with
the search for coaching candidates.195
A tactic used by agents to increase demand for their clients is
to create a new perception, often using the media to push their
clients’ names as candidates for vacant coaching positions or

193

Sander & Fain, supra note 100.
Id. Former NCAA President Myles Brand tended to agree: “I think universities
need to get good advice on contracts. . . . Some universities do, some don’t. There could
be someone on campus, or they should hire an attorney who specializes in contract law
for sports.” Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part II, supra note 189 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
195
See Brian Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part IV: Search Consultants Are Seamlessly
Weaving Their Way Into the Coaching Search Web, CSTV.COM, Jan. 31, 2008,
http://www.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/stories/013108aag.html. Consulting services
typically include “gauging candidate interest, presenting candidates to decision-makers,
performing background checks and setting up interviews . . . .” Id. “Because of the
tremendous amount of media coverage for most searches, some headhunters . . . keep no
paper trail of their contacts—no e-mails, no letters, etc., to protect the process from
Freedom of Information Act requests from the media.” Id.
194
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“soon-to-be” vacancies.196 Athletic department officials panic over
speculation that a coach is considering an offer from another
school or an NFL team, and regardless of whether the threat is real
or simply created by the “rumor mill,” coaches often receive salary
raises because of it. For example, when Arkansas reached out to
Auburn’s football coach, Tommy Tuberville, about its opening and
the media reported that Tuberville might go, Auburn panicked out
of fear of losing its coach and gave him a $200,000 raise despite
the $6 million buyout in his contract that would be owed to Auburn
if he left.197 In another example, after only seven games into his
first season at Notre Dame, agent Bob LaMonte persuaded Notre
Dame to extend Charlie Weis’s original contract in large part
because LaMonte was successful in convincing Notre Dame about
the prospective NFL interest in Weis after his fast start.198 “So for
LaMonte and another leading coaches agent, Gary O’Hagan, who
is believed to represent many current NFL and collegiate clients,
the threat of more potential employers (both in the NCAA and the
NFL) making viable offers to their clients makes their jobs
easier.”199 Nebraska Chancellor Harvey Perlman said, “Agents
make me worry sometimes about coaches ‘playing the game,’ with
ulterior agendas . . . perhaps to try and get a raise at their job.”200
Coaches add fuel to the fire when they could put an end to the
speculation by simply announcing, “I’m not leaving,” but instead
they “tip-toe around the media inquiries, usually responding that
‘I’m happy here’ or ‘I plan to be the coach here.’”201
2. Boosters
It is widely speculated that donors often play a significant role
in the decisions to hire and fire coaches. The level of donor
influence appears to vary depending upon the particular school,
which can take the form of no involvement whatsoever, merely
giving input or advice, or making pressured threats to withhold
196
197
198
199
200
201

Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part II, supra note 189.
Id.
Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 122.
Id. (citations omitted).
Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part II, supra note 189 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.; see also Self Wants to Stay at Kansas, supra note 78.
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contributions, or actually making the decision regarding who to
fire and hire.202 Donors that contribute significant amounts of
money “carry significant weight at some schools, especially if they
are the ones asked to pony up significant amounts of cash to lure a
coach.”203 One prominent agent who has been involved in dozens
of coaching searches insists that, in 90% of the searches he has
been involved with, “there is a middleman [donor] involved [and]
[t]he average fan doesn’t understand that at some places, major
donors make a lot of the decisions.”204 Needless to say, if a donor
is pushing to hire a certain individual, that coach has tremendous
leverage during the hiring and contract negotiation process.
3. Recruiting Cheap Talent
Professional and collegiate sports are a unique product in that
the athletes playing in the sports not only produce the product, they
are the product. The consumers of this product spend billions of
dollars to watch, in person and on television, the few individuals
on the field and court who are producing the game. The high value
of the players’ labor to produce this product is evident by looking
at professional sports, where individual club player payrolls can
range from $50 to $200 million annually.205 While big-time
college sports constitute a huge commercial enterprise generating
billions in annual revenues, the NCAA and its member institutions
do not share any of the revenues with the players who generate
it.206 Thus, schools do not have the huge player payroll burden that
202

For a discussion and examples of booster influence on coaching decisions at various
schools, see Brian Curtis, The Kingmakers: Part III: Roles of Donors in Coaching
Searches Debated by Administrators, CSTV.COM, Jan. 30, 2008,
http://www.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/stories/013008aau.html [hereinafter Curtis, The
Kingmakers: Part III].
203
Id. (“Universities are often limited by what they can pay a coach or his assistants,
which is supplemented by private donors . . . .”).
204
Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting agent
Jimmy Sexton).
205
See ESPN.com, New York Yankees Salaries, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/teams/
salaries?team=nyy (last visited Sept. 24, 2009) (calculating the 2009 New York Yankees
payroll to be $208,097,414); HoopsHype, NBA Salaries, http://hoopshype.com/salaries
.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
206
“The N.C.A.A.’s notion of amateurism continues to boggle the mind. It is ill
defined at best, hypocritical at worst. The N.C.A.A. embraces a version of amateurism
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offsets the revenue generated like the professional sports teams,
which means a larger percentage of revenue generated by a
school’s football and basketball program is available to fund the
coach’s salary.207 This gives college coaches greater leverage in
the hiring process.
Financial documents obtained by The Indianapolis Star
through public records requests revealed that “43 of the 50 public
school teams in [the 2005 NCAA March Madness basketball]
tournament generated a combined $267 million for their athletic
departments” and “gave out a total of $12 million in men’s
basketball scholarships.”208 A professional club generating that
kind of revenue would spend five to ten times that amount on
players’ salaries.209 Moreover, the coach-to-player spending ratio
in big-time collegiate sports is lopsided compared to professional
sports. The Indianapolis Star’s study, “based on data obtained
through public-records requests to the 215 public universities that
compete in Division I,” found that the coaching staffs from the
teams in the 2006 Final Four made $5.3 million the previous year,
and those four schools spent a total of $1 million on men’s
basketball scholarships.210 The average head coach’s salary in the
NBA is $4 million, and $3 million in the NFL,211 which is
comparable to the salaries of the top collegiate basketball and
football coaches.212 Indeed, the highest-paid major league baseball

that allows the men’s tournament to rake in millions on the backs of talented athletes—
without sharing revenue with those responsible for generating it.” William C. Rhoden, In
Tournaments, N.C.A.A. Shines at Its Athletes’ Expense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at D4,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/sports/ncaabasketball/06rhoden
.html?_r=3.
207
See Van Riper, supra note 10 (“[T]he big businesses of college football and
basketball create genuine wage competition for head coaches. That’s something minor
league baseball doesn’t do for the wallets of big league managers. There aren’t many
fans filling out brackets for the Triple-A playoffs.”).
208
Mark Alesia, Tourney Money Fuels Pay-To-Play Debate, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr.
1, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Alesia, Tourney Money].
209
See, e.g., supra note 205 and accompanying text.
210
Alesia, Tourney Money, supra note 208.
211
Van Riper, supra note 10.
212
See Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 116 (“[I]n the last decade, top college
programs have begun paying on a scale equal to the NFL . . . .”).

C01_KARCHER_FINAL 12-30-09 (DO NOT DELETE)

46

12/30/2009 10:30:28 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 20:1

coach makes less than the highest-paid collegiate football coach.213
Ellen Staurowsky, professor of sport management at Ithaca
College and a member of the Drake Group, noted that “[t]he
hidden part of the budget (in big-time college sports) is the
artificial suppressing of the value of the people making this
run.”214 The suppressed value of college players at the top
revenue-generating schools means more money is available for
coaches whose values most certainly are not suppressed.
According to Mark Alesia of The Indianapolis Star, “[b]ecause
athletes’ ‘compensation’ is capped—at the value of a
scholarship—one way of looking at players’ worth is through the
money spent to get them.”215 The Indianapolis Star’s records
request showed that the 164 schools responding to the request
spent a total of $35 million on recruiting in football and men’s
basketball in 2005, which is an average of slightly more than
$200,000 per school.216 The four schools in the 2005 Final Four
spent an average of $505,000 on recruiting for athletes who
eventually signed scholarships with the schools.217 The $200,000–
$500,000 spent annually by a school to recruit the very athletes
who generate the revenue in big-time collegiate athletics—$75 to
$120 million at the top twenty schools218—is a very cheap payroll
expense. However, the scholarship and recruiting expenses
certainly do not represent the players’ market value because they
are unable to freely market their services to the highest-bidding
schools.
The key to maintaining a successful program is winning, and
the key to winning is to recruit and sign the top talent. Because
there is relatively little variance among schools in the amounts they
spend annually in recruiting and “capped” scholarships expense,
the schools obtain a competitive advantage in recruiting by hiring
and keeping the coaches who are the best recruiters. The
213

Van Riper, supra note 10 (“The Dodgers’ Joe Torre, baseball’s highest-paid
manager at $4.3 million a year, is the third highest-paid head man in Los Angeles, behind
the NBA Lakers’ Phil Jackson and (barely) USC football coach Pete Carroll.”).
214
Alesia, Tourney Money, supra note 208 (internal quotation marks omitted).
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
See Top Revenue Producers, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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suppressed market value of the players is shifted to the salaries of
coaches, who, unlike the players, are able to freely market their
services to the highest bidders. A coach who gives the school a
competitive advantage in recruiting not only drives up the coach’s
market value, but also gives the coach a lot of leverage in
negotiating compensation.
II. THE UNIVERSITY’S REMEDIES UPON BREACH
As discussed above, a coach who is terminated by the school
without cause before the expiration of the contract term is entitled
to compensation.219 When the tables are turned and a coach leaves
the school for a more lucrative deal at another institution prior to
the expiration of the contract term, the coach has committed a
breach of contract.220 The available remedies for a breach in this
situation, in theory, consist of suing for damages, seeking a
negative injunction to prevent the coach from working for the other
institution, or simply canceling the contract and allowing the coach
to leave.221 But as one scholar noted, the relationship between the
school and the coach is “somewhat unbalanced” because “[w]hile
the coach has clear contractual remedies against the university for
breach of contract, the same may not be true if the coach decides to
terminate performance.”222 To combat the imbalance in the
relationship between school and coach, in recent years more
schools have begun to insist upon a liquidated damages provision
in the contract.
A. Liquidated Damages Clauses
When a coach breaches by leaving prior to the expiration of the
term, schools are increasingly seeking to be compensated in some

219

See Sander & Fain, supra note 100.
See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 372.
221
Id.
222
Greenberg, supra note 5, at 245–46. “The advantage may lie with the coach ‘who
can breach the contract and leave the relationship with virtual impunity.’” Id. at 246
(quoting Judson Graves, Commentary, Coaches in the Courtroom: Recovery in Actions
for Breach of Employment Contracts, 12 J.C. & U.L. 545, 548 (1985)).
220
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form by the breaching coach,223 just as the coach is compensated
when the university fires him. The compensation is typically paid
to the school pursuant to a liquidated damages provision in the
contract, which is negotiated between the two sides and often paid
by the breaching coach’s new institution.224 Similar to the typical
buyout clause when the coach is fired by the institution, the
amount owed under the liquidated damages clause is greatest when
the coach leaves early in the contract term and the amount
decreases incrementally as the termination date gets closer to the
end of the term. Oftentimes the amount owed is based upon the
coach’s base salary multiplied by the number of years remaining
on the term of the contract at the time of the termination.225 For
example, in Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo,226 the liquidated
damages provision at issue provided that if the coach resigns or
otherwise terminates his employment, and is employed or
performing services for a person or institution other than
Vanderbilt, he would “pay to the University as liquidated damages
an amount equal to his Base Salary, less amounts that would
otherwise be deducted or withheld from his Base Salary for income
and social security tax purposes, multiplied by the number of years
(or portion(s) thereof) remaining on the Contract.”227
The pertinent question regarding liquidated damages provisions
is whether they are designed to compensate the school for damages
incurred for the loss of the coach’s services or rather to penalize
the coach for leaving. DiNardo is the seminal case on the validity
of liquidated damages provisions in coaches’ contracts. Gerry
DiNardo resigned as Vanderbilt’s head football coach to accept the
head football coaching position at Louisiana State University, and
Vanderbilt brought suit to enforce the liquidated damages
223

See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 372.
Id. For specific examples of liquidated damages provisions, see Greenberg, supra
note 5, at 248–52.
225
See, e.g., Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[U]sing
the number of years left on the contract multiplied by the salary per year was a reasonable
way to calculate damages considering the difficulty of ascertaining damages with
certainty.”).
226
174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999).
227
Id. at 753–54. The coach’s base salary was initially set at $100,000, and he received
salary increases in following years. Id. at 754.
224
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provision.228 The coach argued that the liquidated damages
provision in his contract was a “thinly disguised, overly broad noncompete provision” and constituted an unenforceable penalty
under Tennessee law.229 Under Tennessee law, similar to most
jurisdictions, “a provision will be considered one for liquidated
damages, rather than a penalty, if it is reasonable in relation to the
anticipated damages for breach, measured prospectively at the time
the contract was entered into, and not grossly disproportionate to
the actual damages.”230 The district court held that, “given the
nature of the unquantifiable damages in the case,” the use of a
formula based on a coach’s salary to calculate the liquidated
damages was reasonable, and further explained:
“The potential damage to [Vanderbilt] extends far
beyond the cost of merely hiring a new head
football coach. It is this uncertain potentiality that
the parties sought to address by providing for a sum
certain to apply towards anticipated expenses and
losses. It is impossible to estimate how the loss of a
head football coach will affect alumni relations,
public support, football ticket sales, contributions,
etc. . . . As such, to require a precise formula for
calculating damages resulting from the breach of
contract by a college head football coach would be
tantamount to barring the parties from stipulating to
liquidated damages evidence in advance.”231
In rejecting the coach’s contention that his salary has no
relationship to the damages incurred by the university, which,
according to the coach would not go beyond the cost of hiring a
replacement coach, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s ruling and upheld the liquidated damages provision
because both parties understood and agreed that the coach’s
resignation would result in damage to the university beyond the
228

Id. at 753.
Id. at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted).
230
Id.
231
Id. at 755–56 (alteration in original) (quoting Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 974 F.
Supp. 638, 642 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)). The district court entered judgment against the
coach for $281,886.43, and the coach appealed. Id. at 755.
229
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cost of hiring a replacement.232 Applying the standard for
enforceability of liquidated damages clauses, the court of appeals
held that “using the number of years left on the contract multiplied
by the salary per year was a reasonable way to calculate damages
considering the difficulty of ascertaining damages with
certainty.”233 The court of appeals noted that the coach was hired
for “a unique and specialized position, and the parties understood
that the amount of damages could not be easily ascertained should
a breach occur.”234 Finally, the court of appeals even hinted that
there was nothing particularly unfair about the liquidated damages
provision in that it “was reciprocal and the result of negotiations
between two parties, each of whom was represented by
counsel.”235
The dissenting judge in DiNardo, Judge David Nelson,
believed that the liquidated damages provision functioned as a
penalty and was not intended to make the university whole as a
result of “being left in the lurch.”236 First, noting that the provision
only makes the coach liable for liquidated damages if he is
employed or performing services for another university during the
unexpired term of the contract, “how the coach spends his postresignation time could not reasonably be expected to affect the
university’s damages.”237 Second, Judge Nelson questioned how a
formula based on the coach’s “‘take-home pay’” and tied to the
232
Id. at 756 (“Vanderbilt offered the two-year contract extension to DiNardo well over
a year before his original contract expired. Both parties understood that the extension
was to provide stability to the program, which helped in recruiting players and retaining
assistant coaches.”).
233
Id. at 757. The court of appeals determined that “Vanderbilt did not need to
undertake an analysis to determine actual damages” and “[t]he fact that liquidated
damages declined each year DiNardo remained under contract, is directly tied to the
parties’ express understanding of the importance of a long-term commitment from
DiNardo.” Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. “The contract also contained reciprocal liquidated damage provisions.
Vanderbilt agreed to pay DiNardo his remaining salary should Vanderbilt replace him as
football coach, and DiNardo agreed to reimburse Vanderbilt should he leave before his
contract expired.” Id. at 753.
236
Id. at 760 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237
Id. (“[S]hould the coach choose to quit in order to lie on a beach somewhere, the
university would presumably suffer the same damages that it would suffer if he quit to
coach for another school.”).
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number of years remaining on the contract could possibly
constitute a reasonable estimate of the university’s damages.238
According to the judge, the university’s actual damages are the
proper measure of recovery and the case should have been
remanded to the district court for a determination of the extent of
any actual damages suffered by the university as a result of the
coach’s breach.239 But this last point merely begs the question
posited by the majority as well as the district court, which
essentially formed the basis of the majority’s ruling, and that is,
how can the actual damages suffered by the university be
quantified?
A lawsuit that garnered much attention and publicity recently,
and that put to the test the “reasonable measure of the university’s
damages” standard, was West Virginia University v. Rodriguez.240
In 2007, West Virginia’s then head football coach, Rich
Rodriguez, resigned and accepted the head coaching position at the
University of Michigan.241 At issue in the lawsuit was the validity
of a $4 million liquidated damages provision in Rodriguez’s
contract with West Virginia.242 In July of 2008, a settlement was
reached in which Rodriguez and Michigan agreed to pay $1.5

238

Id. at 760–61. “[I] am aware of no reason to believe that damages arising from the
need to replace a prematurely departing coach could reasonably be expected to vary in
direct proportion to the number of years left on the coach’s contract.” Id. at 760. The
dissenting judge further wrote:
[T]he use of a “take-home pay” measuring stick suggests that the
function of the stick was to rap the coach’s knuckles and not to
measure the university’s loss. Such factors as the number of tax
exemptions claimed by the coach, or the percentage of his pay that he
might elect to shelter in a 401(k) plan, would obviously bear no
relation at all to the university’s anticipated damages.
Id. at 761.
239
Id. at 761.
240
No. 1:08 (N.D. W. Va. filed Sept. 27, 2007); see, e.g., Posting of Howard M.
Wasserman to West Virginia University College of Law Sports & Entertainment Law
Society, West Virginia University v. Richard Rodriguez: The Legal Perspective,
http://richrodriguezlaw.blogspot.com/ (July 13, 2008, 12:05 EST) (discussing and
analyzing the events as the Rodriguez lawsuit unfolded and posting links to documents
filed in the case).
241
See, e.g., MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 377–78 (citing Vicki Smith, Rodriguez,
Michigan to Pay WVU $4 Million, PITTSBURG TRIB.-REV., July 10, 2008).
242
See id.
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million and $2.5 million, respectively, to West Virginia.243
Interestingly, the employment agreement between Rodriguez and
Michigan includes a $4 million liquidated damages provision.244
Even though the lawsuit lacks the value of legal precedent in that it
settled prior to a judicial determination on the enforceability of the
liquidated damages provision, which involved a much steeper
liquidated damages amount than was at issue in the DiNardo case,
the Rodriguez settlement will most certainly be relied upon by
schools seeking to enforce liquidated damages provisions against
coaches jumping ship.
West Virginia’s refusal to settle the case for less than the full
amount of the liquidated damages clause tends to suggest that the
University believed it had a relatively strong case, and perhaps
rightfully so. As the district court in DiNardo found, and the
majority on appeal agreed, it is extremely difficult to quantify the
actual damages to the university attributable to the loss of a head
football coach, which includes, among other things, the affect on
alumni relations, public support, football ticket sales and
contributions.245 Even Judge Nelson did not express disagreement
with the majority on that point. While Judge Nelson criticized the
liquidated damages formula in the contract as bearing little or no
relation to a reasonable estimate of the university’s anticipated
damages and he would have remanded the case to the district court
for a determination of the university’s actual damages,246 the judge
did not offer any alternative formula that would bear such a
relation nor did he offer any explanation as to how the lower court
could determine the actual damages incurred by the university.
And therein lies the problem, and in fact lends support for
enforceability because “liquidated damages clauses are inserted

243

See id. As part of the settlement, Michigan agreed to pay Rodriguez’s attorney’s
fees incurred in the litigation. Id. at 377. “The amounts due to institutions under such
provisions are often paid by the breaching coaches’ new institutions.” Id. at 372.
244
See id. at 377–78.
245
Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 974 F. Supp. 638, 642–43 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)).
246
Id. at 760–61 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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where damages from breach are uncertain, not when they can be
precisely ascertained.”247
Judge Nelson’s argument that the university’s damages could
not be “expected to vary in direct proportion to the number of
years left on the coach’s contract”248 is misplaced. Judge Nelson
overlooked the primary basis for the majority’s decision, which
was that the university wanted a five-year contract because, as the
contract language expressly provided, “a long-term commitment
by DiNardo was important to the University’s desire for a stable
intercollegiate football program and that this commitment was of
essence to the contract.”249 Moreover, when the university offered
a two-year extension well over a year before the original contract
expired, it signaled that “[b]oth parties understood that the
extension was to provide stability to the program, which helped in
recruiting players and retaining assistant coaches.”250 Thus,
“stability” is what the university gets in return for the coach’s
guaranteed salary commitment, and when the coach leaves before
the expiration of the term, the university loses the stability. It is
the loss of stability that constitutes the university’s damages and
which are difficult to quantify. However, when the parties attempt
to prospectively measure the university’s anticipated damages at
the time they enter the contract, it is not unreasonable for the
parties to agree that the uncertain amount of damages (whatever
that amount may be) attributable to the loss of stability would vary
depending upon the number of years of stability the university lost
at the time the coach commits the breach. In the words of the
majority, “[t]he fact that liquidated damages declined each year
DiNardo remained under contract, is directly tied to the parties’
express understanding of the importance of a long-term
commitment from DiNardo.”251 It would also not be unreasonable
for the parties to measure anticipated damages based upon a lump
247

Beasley v. Horrell, 864 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the
cancellation provision in interest-bearing, non-negotiable promissory note, providing note
would be cancelled and void if noteholder failed to make any payment under leases
executed in conjunction with note, was an unenforceable penalty).
248
See DiNardo, 174 F. 3d at 760 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249
Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
250
Id.
251
Id. at 757.
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sum payment irrespective of the number of years remaining on the
contract at the time the coach resigns.252
In the absence of a liquidated damages provision in the
contract, what recourse does the university have when a coach
leaves before the expiration of the contract term? Simply
canceling the contract and allowing the coach to leave is one
option. This option effectively makes the coach’s long-term
contractual commitment meaningless and the contract tantamount
to a one-way street in which the university is bound for the entire
length of the contract but the coach is not. Despite the fact that the
coach is clearly in breach for leaving, institutions often avoid
litigation partly because they believe litigation is costly and tends
to prolong negative public relations which can cast a shadow over
the athletic program for years to come.253 “As a result, most
employees, and certainly most coaches, have historically been able
to leave their employment virtually at will despite their prior
contractual commitments.”254 The available legal remedies to the
university are to sue the coach for damages or injunctive relief.
B. Suing for Damages
A bedrock principle of contract law is that “[d]amages for
breach of contract should be sufficient ‘to place the plaintiff in the
position he would be in if the contract had been fulfilled.’”255
Consequential damages such as lost profits may also be recovered
for breach of an employment contract if the employer can show
252

However, some courts have held that a lump sum payment that makes “no attempt to
graduate the amount according to the length of the unexpired part of the term” constitutes
a penalty, not liquidated damages. Beasley, 864 S.W.2d at 49 (quoting Jennings v. First
Nat’l Bank, 30 S.W.2d 1049, 1053 (Mo. App. 1930)). These cases are distinguishable
because the breach in these cases consisted of a failure to make required payments during
the term of the contract, and, thus, a lump sum payment that does not differentiate based
on the timing of the breach is not a valid attempt at making a reasonable estimate of the
damages that could result from missed or late payments. See id. at 49–50; Jennings, 30
S.W.2d at 1053.
253
See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 246.
254
Graves, supra note 222, at 549.
255
Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905, 910 (10th Cir. 1977) (quoting C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON DAMAGES § 137, at 560 (1935)) (holding that in order to
recover for lost profits, plaintiff basketball team was required to show coach was unique
or irreplaceable).
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that those damages were reasonably foreseeable when the contract
was made.256 In cases where an employee is in breach of an
employment agreement,
the recoverable damages are normally measured by
the cost to the employer of obtaining equivalent
services elsewhere, plus consequential damages.
Some cases indicate that in assessing such damages,
the “market value” of the lost services must be
measured against that of the substitute services
procured by the employer to remedy the breach.257
Thus, in theory, damages under the normal measure would
consist of the difference in salary of the existing coach and the
substitute coach and any incidental costs incurred by the school in
locating and signing the substitute coach, plus consequential
damages related to the coach’s breach. Because coaches are not
fungible, a court could conclude that any salary differential that
resulted from the hiring of a more talented substitute coach thereby
caused no net loss to the team.258 Conversely, a court could
determine that the school, when suddenly faced with a vacancy as
a result of its coach’s decision to leave, had to pay more than
market value for the substitute coach, in which case the school
would be entitled to the difference between the “true” market value
of the substitute coach and the “inflated” market value that the
school paid to get him.
The market value of a coach’s services is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to determine thereby making it impractical to apply
256
See id. at 910 (“[T]he elements of the plaintiff’s (employer’s) damages are two: the
reasonably necessary expense to which plaintiff was put in procuring a new agent, and
the loss of profits (if any profits were lost) caused by defendants’ breach.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer Co., 160 P.2d 804,
812 (Cal. 1945))).
257
Graves, supra note 222, at 548–49 (citations omitted).
258
Cf. LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & AMATEUR SPORTS § 10:21 (Gary A. Uberstine ed.,
West Group 1989) (2008) (recognizing a similar problem in the context of a professional
athlete’s breach). Uberstine also suggests an alternative measure of damages that would
focus on the salary differential between the athlete’s original contract and his new
contract with the other team. Id. Uberstine notes that this methodology could be
undesirable from the team’s standpoint because its losses would typically exceed the
salary differential, but it would deter athletes from jumping ship solely for the financial
benefit. Id.
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the normal measure of employment contract damages to college
coaches’ contracts.259 The value of a coach to one school’s athletic
program may not be the same to another school’s athletic program.
The same holds true in trying to determine the market value of a
player’s services, as articulated by Professor Geoffrey Rapp:
The services of a player are “extremely difficult to
value and impossible to prove.” Sports contracts do
have a relative advantage over, say, opera contracts,
in that sports contracts can be compared to one
another in relative worth using player statistics. It is
possible to determine if players are “under” or
“over” paid given their performance and prevalent
market trends. However, a significant problem
remains. The value of a player to a team may not
be the same as the overall “market value” of the
player. It is “exceedingly burdensome to establish
what the loss of one player, even a superstar player,
will have on the club’s performance and its
financial condition.”
As a result of these
limitations, there are no recorded cases in which a
club successfully pursued a claim for damages
against an athlete.260
Rather than focusing on a coach’s market value, damage to the
university as a result of a coach’s failure or refusal to perform
should focus on the school’s total economic loss, i.e. the loss of
stability in the program, which includes, among other things, the
monetary loss flowing from its adverse impact on alumni relations,
public support, ticket sales, contributions, recruiting, retaining
assistant coaches and admissions.261 However, it is extremely
difficult to assign a dollar value to these losses incurred, not to
mention the causation problems in determining whether such
losses were due to the coach’s breach. Because of the difficulty in
determining the university’s damages, the school may instead opt
259

See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 246.
Geoffrey Rapp, Affirmative Injunctions in Athletic Employment Contracts:
Rethinking the Place of the Lumley Rule in American Sports Law, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 261, 269–70 (2006) (citations omitted).
261
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
260
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for injunctive relief to prevent the coach from accepting
employment at another institution.
C. Injunctive Relief
In contracts for personal services, including employment
agreements, courts of equity refuse to grant injunctive relief in the
nature of specific performance, i.e. ordering an individual to
perform a contract, due to (1) the inherent difficulty or
impossibility of enforcing and supervising the performance and
quality of uniquely personal efforts, (2) the undesirability of
compelling the continuance of personal association after disputes
have arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone, and (3) the view
that judicial compulsion of services violates the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude.262 However,
“where an employee refuses to render services to an employer in
violation of an existing contract, and the services are unique or
extraordinary, an injunction may issue to prevent the employee
from furnishing those services to another person for the duration of
the contract.”263
Under such circumstances, a “negative
injunction” is warranted because (a) the employee either expressly
or by clear implication agreed not to work elsewhere during the
262

See Am. Broad. Co. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981); 42 AM. JUR. 2D
Injunctions § 127 (2009). But see Rapp, supra note 260, at 263–64 (advocating for
specific performance enforceable by affirmative injunction as a remedy for breach of
contract when players hold out).
263
Wolf, 420 N.E.2d at 367 (citing Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Gallagher, 201 N.Y.S.
577, 579–81 (1923)); see also Boston Celtics Ltd. P’ship v. Shaw, 908 F.2d 1041, 1048–
49 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting general policy of disfavoring enforcement of personal service
contracts in the sports context “typically prevents a court from ordering an individual to
perform a personal service; it does not prevent a court from ordering an individual to
rescind a contract for services and to refrain from performing a service for others.”
(citations omitted)); Minn. Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979, 987 (M.D.N.C.
1969) (“It is generally held that where a person agrees to render personal services to
another, which require special and unique knowledge, skill and ability, so that in default
the same services cannot easily be obtained from others, a court of equity is empowered
to negatively enforce performance of the agreement by enjoining its breach.”); Dallas
Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (“It is
well established in this State and other jurisdictions that injunctive relief will be granted
to restrain violation by an employee of negative covenants in a personal service contract
if the employee is a person of exceptional and unique knowledge, skill and ability in
performing the service called for in the contract.”).
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term of the contract and (b) when the requisite unique services
element is met, the employer would be irreparably harmed if the
employee is permitted to work for a competitor.264 Moreover, the
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude265
does not pose the same concern that is present with affirmative
injunctions in personal services contracts because with a negative
injunction the coach is free to quit and the court is not ordering the
coach to work.266 To obtain a negative injunction, the school must
demonstrate that it is irreparably harmed by the coach’s breach and
must show absence of substantial harm to the coach, other
interested parties and the public interest if the injunction is
granted.267
1. Irreparable Harm: The Unique Skills Test
There is a paucity of cases in which a professional team or
school has sought a negative injunction to prevent a coach from
jumping prior to the expiration of the contract term. The seminal
case is New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of
Colorado,268 in which the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
preliminary injunction enjoining the University of Colorado from
hiring Chuck Fairbanks as its head football coach, who was at the
264

See Wolf, 420 N.E.2d at 367 (noting that when the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the
employee from performing for someone else, the “negative injunction” is a standard
remedy in the sports and entertainment industries). This notion of a negative injunction
emanates from the classic case of Lumley v. Wagner in which the Queen’s Theatre sought
injunctive relief to require opera star Johanna Wagner to perform her contract and to
prevent her from performing elsewhere, and the court held that the theatre could not get
specific performance to compel Wagner to perform for the Queen’s Theatre but could
obtain a negative injunction to prevent her from performing elsewhere. Lumley v.
Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch.).
265
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
266
But cf. Rapp, supra note 260, at 278 (arguing that even when an affirmative
injunction is sought in athletic contract disputes, the Thirteenth Amendment should not
be a defense because “the Amendment’s target was slavery and its attendant
circumstances, not a relationship between a multi-millionaire athlete and a sports
franchise owned by multi-millionaires.”).
267
See generally Wolf, 420 N.E.2d at 403 (“[S]ince the services must be unique before
negative enforcement will be granted, irreparable harm will befall the employer should
the employee be permitted to labor for a competitor.” (citation omitted)).
268
592 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1979).
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time employed as head football coach of the New England Patriots
under a contract that had five years remaining on it.269 Fairbanks’s
contract with the Patriots contained a provision that, during the
term, Fairbanks was not to provide services connected with
football to any entity other than the plaintiff, or to perform services
of any kind for anyone, without the plaintiff’s permission.270 In
this regard, Judge Aldrich wrote:
At the hearing Fairbanks testified that although the
contract read “services directly connected with
football . . . (or for) another entity not connected
with football,” this meant, simply, activities
competitively connected with the Patriots. . . .
Parenthetically, having in mind, as sometimes
helpless dial-spinners, that professional and
prominent college football teams compete for TV
viewers, and hence, presumably, for the advertising
dollar, we may wonder whether we have to accept
at face value the protestation of no competitive
activity here. In any event, there is ample authority
contradicting both aspects of defendants’ legal
position. Indeed, some courts have gone even
further, and have enjoined the defaulting athlete
himself from noncompetitive sport. We would not
distinguish between an athlete and a coach.271
The foregoing excerpt demonstrates that, in the view of the
First Circuit Court of Appeals, there is sufficient “economic”
competition between professional and collegiate sports teams such

269

Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1198 n.1 (“10(b) Fairbanks shall not render services directly connected with
football during the period of his employment other than for the Patriots except with the
express written permission of the Patriots, which permission shall not be unreasonably
withheld. (d) Fairbanks shall not render services to another entity not connected with
football during the period of employment except with the express written permission of
the Patriots, which permission shall not be unreasonably withheld.”); see also Greenberg,
supra note 5, at 248 (noting that in many coaches’ contracts, “the coach will be required
to promise not to accept employment under any circumstances as a coach at any other
institution, or with any professional league, or with any other competing entity, without
first obtaining permission from the university” (internal quotations marks omitted)).
271
New Eng. Patriots, 592 F.2d at 1200 (citations omitted).
270
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that a professional club is irreparably harmed when a coach leaves
before the expiration of his contract to accept employment at the
collegiate level (and presumably vice-versa as well).272 Another
significant aspect of the court of appeals’ ruling is that, by relying
on the negative injunction cases involving professional players, a
coach is similar to an athlete as it relates to the unique services
element.273
This is consistent with the DiNardo court’s
determination that the coach was hired for a “unique and
specialized position.”274 The court of appeals in New England
Patriots affirmed the district court’s findings that damages would
be difficult to ascertain and that Fairbanks’ services were unique,
and that, accordingly, the Patriots would be irreparably harmed by
the loss of his services.275 Although the New England Patriots
case was decided over thirty years ago, given the exponential
increases in both revenue and coaches’ salaries since that time, the
irreparable harm element is perhaps even more compelling today
than it was back then.

272

See id. As one scholar noted in discussing the case, “The competition may exist
between teams in a league, teams in different leagues, or teams in different sports.” RAY
YASSER, JAMES R. MCCURDY, C. PETER GOPLERUD & MAUREEN A. WESTON, SPORTS
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 469 (6th ed. 2006).
273
See New Eng. Patriots, 592 F.2d at 1200.
In many instances, a coach’s contract will contain a unique service
clause to protect the university from a breaching coach. By agreeing
to this clause, the coach acknowledges that he has a special, unique
and exceptional skill, and that the university’s need for continuity in
its coaching—as well as any further acquisition of coaching
experience—will reflect that uniqueness.
Greenberg, supra note 5, at 247–48.
274
Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1999).
275
New Eng. Patriots, 592 F.2d at 1199. The court of appeals also held that even
though the Patriots allegedly lured Fairbanks from the University of Oklahoma, inducing
him to break his contract there, the Patriots were not barred from relief by the doctrine of
unclean hands. Id. “Both [Fairbanks and the Patriots] may have done the University of
Oklahoma dirt, but that does not mean unclean hands with respect to ‘the controversy in
issue.’” Id.; see also Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36, 42–43 (10th Cir. 1966)
(issuing injunction, rejecting defense of unclean hands based on club signing college
player prior to completion of eligibility in violation of NCAA rules). But see N.Y.
Football Giants, Inc. v. L.A. Football Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471, 474 (5th Cir. 1961)
(denying injunction on basis of defense of unclean hands resulting from club signing
college player prior to completion of eligibility in violation of NCAA rules).
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In Northeastern University v. Brown,276 Northeastern sought a
negative injunction to prevent its head football coach, who was in
the first year of a six-year contract, from accepting an offer to
coach at the University of Massachusetts (“U. Mass.”).277 The
court’s opinion commences with a quote from Detroit Football Co.
v. Robinson278 that
described these types of “contract jumping cases”
with players and coaches as follows:
“This case is but another round in the sordid
fight for football players [or coaches] . . . It is a
fight characterized by deception, double dealing,
campus jumping, secret alumni subsidization, semiprofessionalism and professionalism. It is a fight
which has produced as part of its harvest this
current rash of contract jumping suits. It is a fight
which so conditions the minds and hearts of these
athletes [and coaches] that one day they can agree
to play [or coach] football for a stated amount for
one group, only to repudiate that agreement the
following day or whenever a better offer comes
along.”279
Regarding irreparable harm, the court in Northeastern
University focused on the competitive disadvantage to
Northeastern and found that (1) at U. Mass. the coach would be
able to use his knowledge of Northeastern’s program, plays and
procedures against Northeastern, (2) Northeastern and U. Mass.
compete with each other for recruits as well as for regional
television coverage of their games, and (3) Northeastern and U.
Mass. are members of the same football conference and play
against each other every year.280 The judge therefore granted an
interim injunction.281 One month later, the judge lifted the
276

No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2004).
Id. at *1–*2.
278
186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La. 1960) (alteration in original).
279
Ne. Univ., 2004 WL 616225, at *1 (quoting Detroit Football Co., 186 F. Supp. at
934).
280
Id. at *4.
281
Id.
277
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injunction and instructed the parties to settle, which they ultimately
did.282
Due to the limited case law on the enforcement of coaches’
contracts through negative injunctions, it is also helpful to look at
courts’ rationale for holding that professional athletes meet the
unique services element for the issuance of negative injunctions.
In Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris,283 the Dallas
Cowboys, a member of the NFL, sought an injunction to restrain
Harris, who was under contract with the Cowboys, from playing
football for the Dallas Texans, a member of the American Football
League.284 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s order
granting a temporary injunction in favor of the Cowboys.285 In
doing so, the court of appeals explained what constitutes “unique”
services and relied on the following statement from Philadelphia
Ball Club v. Lajoie:286
“We think, however, that in refusing relief unless
the defendant’s services were shown to be of such a
character as to render it impossible to replace him
he has taken extreme ground. It seems to us that a
more just and equitable rule is laid down in
Pom.Spec.Perf. p. 31, where the principle is thus
declared: ‘Where one person agrees to render
personal services to another, which requires and
presupposes a special knowledge skill, and ability in
the employee, so that in case of a default the same
service could not easily be obtained from others . . .
its performance will be negatively enforced by
enjoining its breach. . . .’ We have not found any
case going to the [same] length of requiring, as a

282

See Mark Blaudschun, Settlement Is Reached on Brown; Umass, NU End Coach
Saga, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2004, at E1. The University of Massachusetts paid
Northeastern $150,000 and agreed to suspend Brown from coaching the first three games
of the 2004–05 season. Id.
283
348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
284
Id. at 39–40.
285
Id. at 47 (“We cannot support harris’ [sic] contention that the contract is so
unreasonable and harsh as to be unenforceable in equity.”).
286
51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902).
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condition of relief, proof of the impossibility of
obtaining equivalent service.”287
The Dallas Cowboys court emphasized the test for uniqueness
is that the service is not easily replaceable as opposed to being
irreplaceable which is “too narrow and limited.”288
The unique skills test satisfies the irreparable harm element for
injunctive relief.289 Numerous courts have found that professional
athletes meet the test;290 however, a small handful of courts have
determined that money damages are an adequate remedy for the
loss of an athlete’s services.291 The Lajoie case is beneficial to
287

Harris, 348 S.W.2d at 44 (quoting Lajoie, 51 A. at 973).
Id. at 44; see MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 412 (“For the past century,
[Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v.] Lajoie has represented the prevailing judicial view
regarding the availability of equitable relief to remedy a professional athlete’s breach of
contract.”).
289
See YASSER ET AL., supra note 272, at 467 (“The ‘irreparable harm’ requirement for
the issuance of the negative injunction usually is determined by the ‘unique skills test.’”).
For a case departing from the unique skills test and denying an injunction based upon the
team’s economic position, see Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp.
261, 269 (D. Mass. 1971) (“The irreparable harm, the probability of which must be
shown by the corporate plaintiff, is harm to its financial and business health.”), remanded
on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972). But see LAW OF PROFESSIONAL &
AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 258, § 10:19 (“Cheevers appears to be of dubious
precedential value because the appellate court strongly questioned the validity of the
lower court’s irreparable harm analysis. . . . [A]s subsequent cases have expressly
‘balked’ on the Cheevers analysis and have continued to endorse the traditional
irreparable harm/unique skills test.”).
290
See YASSER ET AL., supra note 272, at 467 (“Few cases are found involving
professional sports athletes in which courts denied negative injunctions on the basis of
inadequate or ordinary skills.”); see also Winnipeg Rugby Football Club v. Freeman &
Locklear, 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955) (enjoining two rookies without any
professional experience from jumping from a Canadian professional football club to the
Cleveland Browns); Cent. N.Y. Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio
C.P. 1961) (holding that professional players satisfy the unique test per se); Matuszak v.
Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (holding that the question of
unique skills depends on facts of each case). Injunctive relief to prevent players from
jumping was sought as far back as the late 1800s in Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v.
Ewing, 42 F. 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890) and Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9
N.Y.S. 779 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890). For an annotation of negative injunction cases by
sport, see Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 139 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
291
See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Conn.
Prof’l Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Brooklyn Baseball
Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902); Columbus Base Ball Club v. Reiley,
11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 272, 272 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pl. 1891).
288
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understanding why teams are entitled to injunctive relief to prevent
professional players from jumping because the court connects the
dots between the unique skills test and the irreparable harm
requirement for injunctive relief.292 As sports law experts have
noted: “The court enunciated the question as not whether the
player was ‘irreplaceable,’ but whether replacement of the player
on the playing field could be translated into money damages.
Thus, the question was whether harm was irreparable, or the
damage remedy at law inadequate.”293
Moreover, the Lajoie court’s discussion of how the irreparable
harm element is met in the professional player context helps
explain why the court in the New England Patriots case “would
not distinguish between an athlete and a coach.”294 The glaring
similarities between players and coaches for purposes of
irreparable harm and the impact to the team are evident in the
Lajoie court’s opinion:
The court below finds from the testimony that “the
defendant is an expert baseball player in any
position; that he has a great reputation as a second
baseman; that his place would be hard to fill with as
good a player; that his withdrawal from the team
would weaken it, as would the withdrawal of any
good player, and would probably make a difference
in the size of the audiences attending the game.” . . .
292

See Phila. Ball Club v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973, 976 (Pa. 1902).
YASSER ET AL., supra note 272, at 468. According to the court in Lajoie:
We have not found any case going to the length of requiring, as a
condition of relief, proof of the impossibility of obtaining equivalent
service. It is true that the injury must be irreparable; but, as observed
by Mr. Justice Lowrie in Com. v. Pittsburgh & C. R. Co., 24 Pa. 160,
62 Am. Dec. 372: “The argument that there is no ‘irreparable
damage’ would not be so often used by wrongdoers if they would
take the trouble to discover that the word ‘irreparable’ is a very
unhappily chosen one, used in expressing the rule that an injunction
may issue to prevent wrongs of a repeated and continuing character,
or which occasion damages which are estimated only by conjecture,
and not by any accurated standard.”
Lajoie, 51 A. at 973.
294
New Eng. Patriots Football Club v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196, 1200 (1st Cir.
1979); see Lajoie, 51 A. at 976.
293
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He has been for several years in the service of the
plaintiff club, and has been re-engaged from season
to season at a constantly increasing salary. He has
become thoroughly familiar with the action and
methods of the other players in the club, and his
own work is peculiarly meritorious as an integral
part of the team work which is so essential. In
addition to these features which render his services
of peculiar and special value to the plaintiff, and not
easily replaced, Lajoie is well known, and has great
reputation among the patrons of the sport, for ability
in the position which he filled, and was thus a most
attractive drawing card for the public.
....
. . . We have the further fact that the contract has
been partially executed by services rendered, and
payment made therefor, so that the situation is not
now the same as when the contract was wholly
executory. The relation between the parties has
been so far changed as to give to the plaintiff an
equity, arising out of the part performance, to insist
upon the completion of the agreement according to
its terms by the defendant. . . . The plaintiff has so
far performed its part of the contract in entire good
faith, in every detail, and it would therefore be
inequitable to permit the defendant to withdraw
from the agreement at this late day.
....
. . . The defendant sold to the plaintiff, for a
valuable consideration, the exclusive right to his
professional services for a stipulated period, unless
sooner surrendered by the plaintiff, which could
only be after due and reasonable notice and
payment of salary and expenses until the expiration.
Why should not a court of equity protect such an
agreement until it is terminated? The court cannot
compel the defendant to play for the plaintiff, but it

65
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can restrain him from playing for another club in
violation of his agreement.295
It is difficult to argue that college coaches at the major schools
do not have unique skill because of the undisputable fact that there
is a very limited supply of coaches whose services are in such high
demand and who have the ability to command a salary that puts
them among the most highly-compensated coaches in all of sports,
both collegiate and professional. Simply, if they did not have
unique skill, they would not be paid accordingly.296 That is
precisely why some coaches become icons at big-time collegiate
athletic programs, such as Knute Rockne, Bobby Knight, Bo
Schembechler, Woody Hayes, Paul “Bear” Bryant and “Coach K,”
to name just a few.297 These individuals became household names
because of their unique coaching skills and achievements. The
irreparable harm to the university when it loses its highly
successful coach is the loss of stability to the athletic program
which the Dinardo court referred to as “unquantifiable.”298
Indeed, coaches’ contracts often include a clause providing that the
coach acknowledges and agrees that the loss of his services prior to
the expiration of the term would result in irreparable harm to the
university.299 The irreparable harm element for injunctive relief
should be fairly easy to satisfy when a school is requesting a

295

Lajoie, 51 A. at 974–75.
See Cent. N.Y. Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506, 517 (Ohio C.P.
1961) (“Professional players in the major baseball, football, and basketball leagues have
unusual talents and skills or they would not be so employed. Such players . . . are not
easily replaced.”).
297
See Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan Athletics History,
http://bentley.umich.edu/athdept/football/coaches/gschemb.htm (last visited Sept. 24,
2009); Indystar.com, Library Factfiles, http://www2.indystar.com/library/factfiles/
people/k/knight_bob/knight.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009); Ohio State History, Woody
Hayes, https://bucknuts.com/osuhistory/coachhayes.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2009);
The Official Website of Coach Mike Krzyzewski, http://coachk.com (last visited Sept.
24, 2009).
298
Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 974 F. Supp. 638, 642 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)).
299
Greenberg, supra note 5, at 248 (“The contract will also require the coach to agree
that the loss of his services, prior to the expiration of the contractual term and without the
university approval, will cause an inestimable loss to the university, which cannot be
adequately compensated for by money damages.”).
296
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negative injunction to prevent the coach from accepting
employment at another institution.
2. Balancing the Hardships in Granting or Denying Injunctive
Relief
In addition to the requirement of irreparable harm to obtain
injunctive relief, the plaintiff has the burden to show absence of
substantial harm to the defendant, other interested parties and the
public interest, if the injunction requested is granted.300 As one
court noted, “[c]ourts of equity frequently, in resolving a question
concerning injunctive relief, try to evaluate the balance of
hardships on both parties that would result from the granting or the
withholding of the injunction requested.”301 According to sports
law experts, this is the greatest hurdle to obtaining a negative
injunction:
If a court finds the requested injunction will create
an unreasonable hardship to the party sought to be
restrained, the injunction will be denied or its scope
may be limited. What constitutes unreasonableness,
or undue harshness, varies with the particular
circumstances. Factors considered by a court may
include the length of the requested injunction, its
geographical reach, the types of employment or
activities prohibited under the injunction, and its
potential effects in preventing employment or other
opportunities for the restrained party. However,
these factors are balanced against the resulting
damage to the plaintiff if an injunction is not
granted.302
300
See Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 145 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (citing
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972));
see also Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 269 (D. Mass. 1971)
(“It is usual practice for a court of equity, called upon to pass on a claim for injunctive
relief, to weigh the consequences that the granting of the injunctive relief sought would
have on all parties to the litigation.”).
301
Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. at 269.
302
MITTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 415; see also LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & AMATEUR
SPORTS, supra note 258, § 10:23 (“Even when a former team can establish the necessary
prerequisites for equitable relief, courts nevertheless have wide discretion in deciding
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In balancing the hardships to both parties and other interested
parties when a coach leaves for a competitor before the expiration
of his current contract, the substantial harm to the school, the
public interest, and the student-athlete if an injunction is not
granted far outweighs any harm to the coach and competitor school
if the injunction is granted.
a) Harm to the Parties: Preventing Unfair Competition for
Coaches’ Services
A major concern of the courts in balancing the harms in
injunction proceedings is the impact on free and open competition
in the marketplace if the injunction is granted.303 As this section
will address, in the player context, courts have routinely denied
injunctive relief to the club when a player signs with another club
for services to commence after the expiration of the player’s
existing contract.304 The reason being that there is no harm to the
interest of the plaintiff nor the public when (1) the player
(defendant) is not breaching his existing contract and is fully
performing the obligations he agreed to perform for the entire
contract term, and (2) the other club that desires to sign the player
for services to commence after the expiration of the player’s
existing contract has not tortiously interfered with the plaintiff’s
contractual relationship with the player.305 Indeed, to grant an
injunction under such circumstances has a chilling effect on
competition and the ability of the player to freely market his
services to the highest bidder. 306
Such was the case in Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey,307 in
which the NFL Bengals sought an injunction to enjoin a player
(Bergey) and clubs in a competing league (WFL) from signing
whether to grant such relief. In determining whether an injunction should issue, courts
balance the competing needs of teams, players, and society at large.”).
303
See Bergey, 453 F. Supp. at 147 (“As we view it, the ‘public interest’ within the
meaning of that phrase as it is used here is the policy such as that behind the antitrust
laws to encourage to the fullest extent practicable free and open competition in the
marketplace. Restraints on competition are not favored.”).
304
See, e.g., id. at 149.
305
See, e.g., id. at 138.
306
See, e.g., id.
307
453 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
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players to contracts for future services to commence following the
expiration of their contracts with the Bengals. In denying an
injunction, the court reasoned:
[N]either the WFL nor Bergey committed a tortious
or otherwise unlawful act in entering into
negotiations for and reaching agreement upon a
contract for Bergey’s personal services to
commence after the expiration of his contract with
the Bengals. . . . [T]here are no more obligations to
be protected by either party to the Bengals contract
after [expiration] . . . .
....
This Court recognizes such public interest would
probably not stand in the way of plaintiff’s
obtaining injunctive relief if it is able to establish
that the contractual rights it has with its players
have been tortiously, I. e. [sic], maliciously
interfered with (plus irreparable harm and no
adequate remedy at law). On the facts of this case
the Court cannot conclude that such interference as
there may be was due to unfair competition. On the
contrary, it seems to the Court that the threatened
harm is due to competition, and an injunction would
therefore not be in the public interest.
....
It is not the players’ present services for which the
clubs will have to pay more, for those are protected
by contracts which can presumably be enforced in
the usual manner. It is only when the NFL chooses
(and such decision is likely) to join the competition
for the later services of its players that it will incur
these higher costs. In our best judgment, such
higher costs will be attributable to competition and
not unfair competition.308
308

Id. at 144, 147–48 (citations omitted). For holdings consistent with the holding in
Bergey, see Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972); Wash.
Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969); Minn. Muskies v.
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In World Football League v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club,
Inc.,309 referenced in Bergey, the court considered the harmful
effect on competition if players were unable to freely bargain with
other clubs for their services to commence after the expiration of
their current contracts:
We must consider the freedom of contract of the
individual players as well as the rights of the Club
under its present contracts. Bargaining for future
services is a matter of economics. The Club can
assure itself of the continued services and loyalty of
its players by offering them long-term contracts and
other financial inducements. If it chooses not to do
so for economic reasons, it has no legal ground to
complain if the players look elsewhere for their
future careers and enter into contracts for services to
be performed when their present contracts with the
Club expire.310
While the same effect on competition would certainly be
applicable to a coach seeking to leave for another school after the
expiration of his contract, there is no interest of the coach or the
other school worthy of protection whatsoever when the coach
instead wants to breach his existing contract by accepting a new
position before the expiration of his existing contract.311 The most
that could be said is that the coach is not able to freely work for the

Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969); World Football League v. Dallas Cowboys
Football Club, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
309
513 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
310
Id. at 105.
311
Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2004) (finding that the harm to Brown because he would not be able to be the
football coach at U. Mass. and the harm to U. Mass because it would not be able to
employ Brown as its football coach was outweighed by the irreparable harm suffered by
Northeastern).
The breach of contract by Brown was and is obvious, brazen, and
defiant. U. Mass., as the Commonwealth’s premier higher
educational institution was and is so callous in its duty to provide
ethical and moral values for its students. The persons from U. Mass.
involved in this episode have clearly violated the law but above all
else have brought great shame on themselves and the university.
Id.
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employer of his choice if the injunction is granted. However, there
is nothing inherently unreasonable or unduly harsh about a coach
not being able to work for his school of choice, which is not the
equivalent of being denied the opportunity to freely market his
services. To the contrary, the coach was provided the opportunity
to freely market his services to the fullest extent when he agreed,
with the assistance of counsel, to a long-term employment contract
in return for a very high level of guaranteed compensation. In that
contract, the coach expressly agreed (and if not expressly, then
implicitly) to provide his services exclusively to the contracting
school. This negative covenant should be deemed reasonable
because the restriction only exists for the contracted period.312
The frequency at which schools terminate unsuccessful
coaches (oftentimes mid-season) creates a notion that schools
should in turn expect coaches to leave for more prestigious
institutions when they are successful.313 This thought process is
flawed because when the school terminates the coach without
cause for not winning, the coach fully expects, and does receive,
the guaranteed compensation owing through the remainder of the
contract term. To permit a coach to walk away from his
employment is tantamount to transforming a long-term
employment agreement into a one-sided at-will employment
arrangement such that, although the school may not terminate the
coach at will, the coach may leave at will and be relieved of the
coach’s long-term commitment that both sides understood was to
provide stability to the program and was the “essence” of the
agreement.314 Thus, balancing the harms between the school and
coach weighs in favor of the school because if the injunction is
denied, the coach receives a windfall and the school is harmed by
the loss of stability to the program as well as the substantial
312

See LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 258, § 10:19
(“[R]easonableness issues relating to negative covenants are not frequently litigated in
the context of major team sports (primarily because the restriction usually exists only for
the contracted period).”).
313
See supra text accompanying notes 105–13 (discussing dismissal of four
“unsuccessful” coaches).
314
Indeed, the lost stability when the coach breaches the employment contract provides
the basis for enforcing liquidated damages clauses. See Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174
F.3d 751, 756 (6th Cir. 1999).
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economic investment it made in the coach. Moreover, the
competitor school is unjustly enriched and obtains an unfair
competitive advantage if it is permitted to interfere with a school’s
contractual rights with its coach and take from that school the
intangible value and goodwill associated with program stability
and success that was created by the school’s substantial economic
investment in that coach. Indeed, the courts in New England
Patriots and Northeastern University expressed concern over the
unfair competitive advantage obtained by the interfering school.315
The head coach’s influence in maintaining stability to the team
is perhaps more of an issue at the collegiate level (than the
professional level), where the head coach plays a critical role in the
recruitment of student-athletes and the recruits seek assurance that
the coach is going to be around for at least the next few years.316
Therefore, one could argue that the unfair competition advantage
obtained by the interfering school is greater at the collegiate level
than the professional level. But ironically, the NFL, unlike the
NCAA, prohibits interfering with its extensive “no-tampering” rule
that restricts clubs from speaking about their vacancies with any
coach who is already under contract with another club.317 The
absence of a “no-tampering” rule only highlights the absurdity of
the situation at the collegiate level whereby NCAA member
institutions are handing out salary raises to their coaches in order
to keep them from being poached.318 In June of 2009, Oklahoma
extended the contract of its football coach Bob Stoops, who was at
the time already among the top paid football coaches, and the
contract extension added a “stay” bonus of $800,000 if Stoops is
still employed by Oklahoma on January 1, 2011, which is in

315

See New Eng. Patriots Football Club v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.
1979); Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 11,
2004).
316
See Katherine Sulentic, Running Backs, Recruiting and Remedies: College Football
Coaches, Recruits and the Torts of Negligent and Fraudulent Misrepresentations, 14
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 127, 140 (2009) (“A coach is often the most influential
reason for a recruit choosing a school.”).
317
Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 132.
318
See Limón, supra note 104 (“Alabama is one of many schools locked in an
expensive arms race, raising coaching salaries at a blistering pace and putting a strain on
other schools trying to woo and retain top talent.”).
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addition to his yearly $700,000 bonus.319 When the extension was
announced, Oklahoma University President David Boren said that,
while he thinks salaries are too high nationwide, “we can’t control
the national marketplace.”320 But in reality, what Boren is saying
is that they cannot keep competitors from tampering with their
coach, which was the real motivator for Oklahoma to increase the
stay bonus, which would also be paid in July in future years rather
than in October.321 Oklahoma Athletic Director Joe Castiglione
even indicated that the payment date for the stay bonus was
intentionally set after the hiring season when coaches are poached:
“We’re just annualizing what coach Stoops received in the stay
bonus by waiting multiple years. . . . We annualized that amount
so it triggers at a certain time of year following what we would call
the hiring periods—not just collegiate hiring, but the NFL hiring
periods.”322
The NFL’s no-tampering policy provides that, during the
playing season a head coach may not seek or accept other
employment unless he is terminated, and during the off-season a
head coach under contract is still prohibited from seeking or
accepting employment unless “(1) he is dismissed; (2) his club has
granted him permission to explore other employment
opportunities; or (3) his club has granted another club the
opportunity to contact him.”323 The NFL’s no-tampering policy is,
in essence, an anti-poaching rule that not only prohibits another
club from negotiating for services to commence before the
expiration of the coach’s current contract, which would otherwise
constitute tortious interference with contractual relations and may

319

Associated Press, New Deals for Stoops, Capel at Oklahoma Laden with Bonuses,
USA TODAY, June 24, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2009-06-24oklahoma-contracts-stoops-capel_N.htm?obref=obnetwork.
320
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
321
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
322
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). Castiglione further stated, “When those
rumors start floating and people start questioning and speculating what might happen or
whether or not a person is interested . . . they always ask what are we going to do? I
usually say, ‘Well, have you ever looked at what we have already done?’” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
323
Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing and quoting NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL ANTI-TAMPERING POLICY 1 (1999)).
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provide a basis for injunctive relief,324 but also deters another club
from negotiating for future services which is clearly not tortious.
The NFL’s no-tampering policy appears to be effective in
accomplishing its intended purpose. A few examples demonstrate
its effectiveness in preventing and deterring coaches from jumping
ship.
After the St. Louis Rams won the Super Bowl following the
1999 season, Dick Vermeil announced his retirement as head
coach.325 At that time, Vermeil’s contract with the Rams extended
through the 2001 season.326 The Rams replaced Vermeil’s
coaching contract with “a consulting agreement that paid him $2
million over the following four years and . . . expressly provided
that Coach Vermeil was ‘terminated’ as the Rams’ head coach.”327
Approximately one year later, the Rams discovered that Vermeil
was having discussions with the Kansas City Chiefs to fill their
head coaching vacancy and filed a tampering claim against the
Chiefs.328 Despite the fact that the consulting agreement did not
prohibit Vermeil from seeking a head coaching position with
another club in 2000 and 2001, former NFL Commissioner Paul
Tagliabue ruled that “the clear purpose and effect of the [Rams’
324
See New Eng. Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.
1979) (granting injunction based on tortious interference with contractual relations where
defendant negotiated and entered contract for services to commence during the term of
coach’s existing contract with plaintiff); see also Wash. Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v.
Barry, 419 F.2d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1969) (‘“[N]o actionable wrong is committed by a
competitor who solicits his competitor’s employees or who hires away one or more of his
competitor’s employees who are not under contract, so long as the inducement to leave is
not accompanied by unlawful action.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Diodes, Inc. v.
Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25–26 (1968))); Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F.
Supp. 128, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (“This Court recognizes such public interest would
probably not stand in the way of plaintiff’s obtaining injunctive relief if it is able to
establish that the contractual rights it has with its players have been tortiously, I. e. [sic],
maliciously interfered with . . . .”); World Football League v. Dallas Cowboys Football
Club, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (denying injunction sought by
Cowboys against competitor to prevent signings for services following completion of
contractual obligations to Cowboys because “[s]igning such contract is neither a breach
of the contract by the players nor a tortious interference by the future employers, and the
threat to enter into such contracts affords no ground for equitable relief”).
325
Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 132.
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
Id. at 132–33.
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consulting] agreement . . . was that Vermeil would remain retired
from coaching through the 2001 season” and awarded the Chiefs’
second and third round draft picks to the Rams and ordered
Vermeil to pay back the fees he received from the first year of his
consulting contract.329
There have been numerous controversies involving head
coaches Bill Parcells and Bill Belichick. In January of 1997,
Parcells was preparing the New England Patriots for the Super
Bowl, but his agent was telling the Patriots that Parcells would be
terminating his contract at the end of that season to accept a head
coaching position with the New York Jets.330 The Patriots were
successful in an arbitration whereby Tagliabue interpreted Parcells’s
contract as “giving him the right to terminate the contract only for
new positions other than coaching or its equivalent.”331 Thereafter,
Parcells signed a contract with the Jets to be their head coach
beginning in 1998 (after the expiration of his contract with the
Patriots), and for 1997, he would be a paid “consultant.”332 The
Patriots asserted that the consulting arrangement was merely a
subterfuge and that the Jets engaged in tampering.333 Tagliabue
persuaded them to settle the dispute “with Parcells leading the Jets
immediately, and the Patriots getting four draft picks over the next
three years.”334
At the end of the 1999 season, Parcells stepped down as coach
of the Jets and decided to serve as general manager for the
remainder of his contract, at which point the Jets immediately
named its lead assistant coach Bill Belichick as head coach.335 At
329
Id. at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The Chiefs’ conduct did not
technically violate the Policy, since Vermeil should have been characterized as a midlevel club employee (‘other club employee’); he was a consultant, not a coach, and was
given less responsibility than a club president or general manager, both of whom are
considered high-level club employees under the Policy. . . . Notably, Commissioner
Tagliabue considered the Rams’ intentions in his determination that a violation took
place.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting former NFL Commissioner Paul
Tagliabue)).
330
PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 131 (3d ed. 2004).
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
Id.
334
Id.
335
Id. at 131–32.
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the time, Belichick was performing under a six-year contract that
permitted him to leave at any time to become a head coach for
another team but which also provided that if Belichick was still
with the Jets when Parcells left his position as head coach,
Belichick would automatically become the head coach for the
duration of the six-year term.336 Belichick rejected the position the
very next day because he was interested in head coaching the
Patriots.337 Belichick claimed that his Jets contract was no longer
binding on the basis that the owner of the Jets in 1997, when the
contract was signed, had since passed away.338 However,
Tagliabue quickly ruled that Belichick’s contract with the Jets was
still binding and, thus, Belichick had become the Jets head coach
automatically and all other teams were prohibited from negotiating
with Belichick without the Jets’ permission.339 Shortly thereafter,
all three parties—Belichick, the Jets, and the Patriots— entered a
settlement that permitted him to coach the Patriots and required the
Patriots to give the Jets their first round pick in the spring 2000
draft.340
In January of 2002, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers signed Parcells
to a multi-year coaching contract, but “[s]hortly thereafter, . . .
Parcells decided not to coach the team.”341 Approximately one
year later, Parcells had discussions with the owner of the Dallas
Cowboys, Jerry Jones, regarding their head coaching vacancy.342
The general manager of the Buccaneers took the position that clubs
needed permission from the Buccaneers before meeting with
Parcells, in compliance with the no-tampering policy.343 Although
Commissioner Tagliabue acknowledged that the Buccaneers had
established a “substantial claim” of tampering, he ruled that their
336

Id. at 131.
Id. at 132 (“Apparently Belichick did not want to serve as head coach under Parcells
as general manager, and he was actually interested in returning to Boston as coach of the
New England Patriots.”).
338
Id. (“Thus, he argued that he did not automatically become the Jets’ head coach
when Parcells resigned, leaving him free to seek other offers to be a head coach, which he
would have been precluded from doing as the Jets’ head coach.”).
339
Id.
340
Id.
341
Lattinville & Boland, supra note 188, at 133.
342
Id.
343
Id.
337
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only recourse was to seek damages against Parcells individually
because the NFL could not recognize the Buccaneers’ contract
with Parcells as it had never been filed with the NFL office.344 The
Buccaneers elected not to pursue a claim.345
Lastly, in 1998, Cleveland Browns CEO Carmen Policy was
asked at a luncheon whether the Browns would be interested in
hiring head coach Mike Holmgren, who at the time was under
contract with the Green Bay Packers.346 In his response, Policy
first said:
[A]ny comment “would be tampering,” but then
quipped: “Let’s just say if a head coach who’s out
there, who has won a Super Bowl, who has been to
another Super Bowl, who is coaching a team in
contention for the playoffs this year, who is an
offensive-minded coach, looking to perhaps move
when the season’s over, were to be interested” the
Browns would also be interested.347
As one scholar summed up the NFL’s ruling on the Packers’
tampering claim, “despite the luncheon crowd’s laughter in
response to Policy’s rather innocuous humor, the NFL got the last
laugh, issuing a $10,000 fine against the Cleveland Browns.”348
If the NCAA were to adopt a no-tampering policy similar to
the NFL, one could state that this policy presents a potential
antitrust problem on the same basis that regulating coaches’
salaries raises an antitrust problem. For example, when Kentucky
recently lured basketball coach John Calipari away from Memphis
and signed him to an eight-year, $31.65 million contract, former
NCAA President Myles Brand’s response was that “[t]he NCAA is
legally powerless to control the extravagant salaries being thrown
at coaches” and “[i]t’s antitrust if [the NCAA] were to try to
regulate any salaries.”349 Brand was undoubtedly referring to the
344

Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 134.
346
Id.
347
Id.
348
Id. “The [no-tampering policy] specifically states that ‘any public or private
statement of interest in another club’s employee is a violation.’” Id.
349
Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102.
345
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NCAA’s inability to cap or restrict coaches’ salaries under Law v.
NCAA,350 the so-called “Restricted-Earnings” case.351 In Law, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an NCAA rule limiting
the annual compensation of certain Division I entry-level coaches
to $16,000 was an illegal restraint on trade under Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.352 The court of appeals found that:
Nowhere does the NCAA prove that the salary
restrictions enhance competition, level an uneven
playing field, or reduce coaching inequities. . . .
[O]n its face, the REC Rule is not directed towards
competitive balance nor is the nexus between the
rule and a compelling need to maintain competitive
balance sufficiently clear on this record to withstand
a motion for summary judgment.353
The antitrust implications of the NCAA’s adoption of a rule
that would deter multi-million dollar salaried coaches from
breaching their term employment agreements, but which would
also fall short of regulating salaries, are beyond the scope of this
article.354 But needless to say, there are some material differences
between a no-tampering rule similar to the NFL’s policy that does
not regulate compensation and the rule that was struck down in
Law that imposed salary restrictions. These differences are
apparent not only on the face of the rule but are also present in
terms of the nexus between the rule and a compelling need to
maintain competitive balance.355

350

134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
See Limón, supra note 104 (“I don’t see a cap coming on it because we lost that
battle once before with restricted earning coaches. I think it’s restraint of trade and we’d
probably lose again. I think the market has to somehow take care of it.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stanford Athletic Director Bob Bowlsby)).
352
Law, 134 F.3d at 1012.
353
Id. at 1024.
354
But see WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 330, at 132 (noting that when Tagliabue
barred Belichick from leaving the Jets for the Patriots, “Belichick and his attorney Jeffrey
Kessler then unsuccessfully sought an injunction barring enforcement of this
Commissioner ruling as a ‘restraint of trade’ under the Sherman Antitrust Act”).
355
Cf. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding an NCAA rule
limiting the number of assistant coaches member institutions could employ at any one
time). In distinguishing Hennessey, the court of appeals in Law noted:
351
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b) Harm to the Public Interest
In weighing the harm to the public interest in the context of
professional players leaving their team, the Bergey court
acknowledged the existence of a public interest in preserving key
team members’ loyalty, given that members of the public are
devoted followers to such team members and that any such loss
will affect a team’s chances of winning.356 But on balance the
court found that any public interest in loyalty was outweighed by
“the policy of the law to encourage free competition in the
marketplace.”357 However, Bergey can be distinguished in
numerous respects, most of which relate to the distinction between
professional and collegiate athletics.358 Moreover, in Bergey, the
professional players were not breaching their employment
agreements and were leaving after the expiration of their current
contracts.359 The public has an interest in parties’ adherence to
contractual obligations.
As duly noted by the court in
Northeastern University:
There should be no doubt that college sports and the
revenue that they draw are a major business for a
university. At times, at some universities, football
and basketball programs appear to be more
important than the universities’ duty to educate and
their duty to instill in college students basic

Hennessey addresses a restriction on the number of assistant coaches
that a Division I school could employ whereas the REC Rule limits
salary of a certain category of coaches. Therefore, the analysis of the
reasonableness of the restraint in Hennessey, which did not involve a
naked restriction on price, will not control the analysis of the
reasonableness of the REC Rule.
Law, 134 F.3d at 1021.
356
Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (“The Court
would be blind if it did not recognize that there is a public interest of another sort. This is
the concern among fans over the actual and prospective loss of key members of a team of
which they are devoted followers and the effect this may have on that team’s
‘chances.’”).
357
Id.
358
See infra notes 368 and 373 and accompanying text.
359
See Bergey, 453 F. Supp. at 144.
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concepts of ethical conduct and adherence to legal
and moral obligations.360
There are numerous aspects of collegiate sports that separate it
from professional sports for public interest purposes. The fan
loyalty mentioned in Bergey tends to be stronger in collegiate
sports than in professional sports, much of which can most likely
be attributed to the relationship fans develop with the coaches.361
Psychology experts believe that “college coaches have a special
place in the realm of social identity in sports.”362 Rick Grieve,
associate professor of psychology at Western Kentucky, says “[i]t
is very common for people to adopt a team for part of their
identity.”363 According to Christian End, assistant professor of
psychology at Xavier University, sports fans do not identify with
individual players very well due to constant player turnover, but “a
head coach in a major, successful program is in a different
category” because “the fan-coach connection is well-established”
when the coach has held that position for a number of years.364
End further postulates that “when that coach leaves, there are
strong feelings of being rejected, jilted by someone with whom
you have a strong emotional commitment.”365 Loyalty is very
important among sports fans: “A fan is expected to stay loyal even
in difficult years. But fans expect reciprocity from the team.”366
Therefore, when a coach leaves before the expiration of his
contract, not only is the coach breaching his contractual
commitment, but it also constitutes a breach of loyalty. When
Rich Rodriguez left West Virginia for Michigan and challenged
the validity of a $4 million liquidated damages clause in his
employment agreement with West Virginia, U.S. Senator Jay
360

Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2004).
361
Sal Ruibal, State of W.Va. Still Feeling Spurned; Calm Yet to Prevail After
Departure of Native Son, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2008, at 5C, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigeast/2008-01-23-wvu-disgruntledfans_N.htm (discussing the reaction from disgruntled fans following the departure of
West Virginia University football coach Rich Rodriguez).
362
Id. (citing Christian End, Assistant Professor of Psychology at Xavier).
363
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
364
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
365
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
366
Id.
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Rockefeller denounced, “I think it’s amoral—not immoral—but
amoral behavior when you dump your team and take off. I’m
furious at Rich.”367
There is also a public interest in cost containment at public
educational institutions during an economic recession, especially
because of recent state funding cuts for many publicly-funded
universities.368 In regards to the multi-million dollar buyouts paid
to fired football coaches at the end of the 2008 season, Cornell
economics professor Robert Frank noted that “[t]he pattern is very
troubling. We’re spending a lot of money on things that, in the
end, aren’t going to make any difference in how well we do as a
society.”369 Maryland Chancellor Brit Kirwan, who chairs the
Knight Commission, said, “When times are flush, I guess maybe
people look the other way when they see these kinds of numbers.
But I think it’s going to be increasingly difficult for boards to
explain . . . in these tough economic times.”370 Robert Zemsky, the
founding director of the University of Pennsylvania’s Institute for
Research on Higher Education, recently told the Knight
Commission in blatant terms: “Since you’ve been in business,
things have gotten a lot worse. . . . A set of values is not present to
hold athletics accountable, so the competitive pressures of the
market give you what you have.”371 Kirwan analogizes spending
on coaches’ salaries to the excessive salaries of CEOs: “There was
such an outrage about what corporate CEOs were making and now
people are looking at what coaches are making compared to other

367

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Mark Schlabach, Programs Struggle to Balance Budget, ESPN.COM, July 13,
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/columns/story?columnist=schlabach_mark&
id=4314195 (“Many athletic departments are struggling to balance their financial books
after receiving less funding from state legislatures and fewer donations from alumni and
boosters.”); see also Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102 (“Four major footballplaying schools will pay a combined $11.85 million in severance to newly deposed
coaches, a longstanding practice drawing fresh scrutiny as universities and their athletics
departments struggle through the nation’s economic decline.”).
369
Wieberg, Huge Buyouts, supra note 102 (internal quotation marks omitted).
370
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
371
Jack Carey, Knight Commission Told Restraint in College Spending Must Start at
Top, USA TODAY, May 12, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2009-05-12knight-commission_N.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
368
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university personnel, and I think there’s the same concern.”372 The
increasing costs to universities of huge buyouts and salaries as a
result of the coaching carousel at the end of each season is another
factor that weighs in favor of issuing an injunction.
Finally, the tax-exempt status of intercollegiate athletics
distinguishes it from professional sports, and the public has an
interest because it is subsidizing the buyouts and salaries that are
funded by universities with tax-exempt revenue.373 In a letter sent
to former NCAA President Myles Brand from House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas on October 2, 2006
requesting information regarding the tax-exempt purpose of
intercollegiate athletics, Congressman Thomas asked the following
questions specifically related to coaches’ salaries:
From the standpoint of a Federal taxpayer, why
should the Federal government subsidize the
athletic activities of educational institutions when
that subsidy is being used to help pay for escalating
coaches’ salaries, costly chartered travel, and stateof-the-art athletic facilities?
....
Coaches’ salaries account for one of the biggest
expenses of Division I-A athletic departments.
According to reports, more than 35 college coaches
receive salaries of at least one million dollars per
year. Sources of revenue to pay these rising salaries
include student fees, corporate sponsorships, and
television deals. Paying coaches excessive
compensation also makes less revenue available for
other sports, causes many athletic departments to
operate at a net loss, and may call into question the
priorities of educational institutions.

372

Schlabach, supra note 368 (internal quotation marks omitted).
For an in-depth discussion and analysis of federal tax-exemption laws as they apply
to the NCAA and to the universities operating Division I football and basketball
programs, see John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption and College Athletics (Univ.
of Ill., Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-08, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336727.
373
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a. Several Division I-A schools pay their men’s
basketball coaches four to five times more than their
women’s basketball coaches. What additional
educational benefit do men’s basketball coaches
provide beyond that which is provided by women’s
basketball coaches?
b. What actions has the NCAA taken to encourage
its member institutions to curb excessive
compensation for college coaches?
c. In 2000, the NCAA repealed a rule requiring all
athletics-related coaches’ income to be reviewed
and approved by the university. Why did the
NCAA repeal this rule?374
This is a situation in which the questions themselves provide
more information than the answers. So long as intercollegiate
athletics has the benefit of a tax exemption and until the schools
themselves make the effort to control their purse strings, the public
will continue to subsidize coaches’ compensation—one more
factor for a court to consider in an injunction proceeding weighing
in favor of granting injunctive relief.
c) Harm to the Interest of Student-Athletes
“A head coach can sign a 10-year deal, say he’s found his final
job, promise recruits they’ll be part of a glorious future at XYZ U
and then leave before the first year’s [sic] over.”375
As discussed, the NCAA has not implemented a “notampering” policy regarding coaches.376 Thus, coaches are
relatively free to leave with impunity, unless of course the former
institution enforces a liquidated damages clause in the contract or
in the absence of such a clause sues for damages or injunctive

374

For the full text of the letter, see Letter from Bill Thomas, Chairman, House Ways
and Means Committee to Dr. Myles Brand, President, National Collegiate Athletic
Conference (Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/200610-05-congress-ncaa-tax-letter_x.htm.
375
Jim Thomas, Coaching Searches Get Thumbs Down, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 20, 2007, at
C3.
376
See supra text accompanying note 318.
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relief. However, the same does not hold true for student-athletes.
The NCAA has a no-tampering policy with regards to studentathletes that prohibits schools from making any contact whatsoever
with student-athletes under scholarship with another institution
without first receiving permission from that institution.377
Moreover, student-athletes are deterred from transferring to
another institution because NCAA rules require them to sit out for
a full academic year if they transfer, unless the former institution
gives permission.378 This inconsistent treatment of coaches and
student-athletes under NCAA rules, which is fundamentally unfair
to student-athletes simply on its face, combined with the impact to
student-athletes when the head coach leaves the athletic program in
the lurch, makes the case for injunctive relief all the more
compelling.379
In a law review article analyzing head football coach
responsibility for athlete academic performance and good
citizenship, one commentator posed the question, “what is the role
of head coaches in relation to the core business of universities, the
education of the next generation in preparation for their
assumption of societal responsibilities[?]”380 The NCAA is
comprised of academic institutions whose mission and purpose are
recognized in its constitution and bylaws. Principles of education
377

NCAA, 2008–09 NCAA Division I Manual, Bylaw 13.1.1.3 (effective Aug. 1,
2008), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/Division
_1_Manual_2008-09e9e568a1-c269-4423-9ca5-16d6827c16bc.pdf [hereinafter NCAA
Division I Manual] (“An athletics staff member or other representative of the institution’s
athletics interests shall not make contact with the student-athlete of another NCAA or
NAIA four-year collegiate institution, directly or indirectly, without first obtaining the
written permission of the first institution’s athletic director (or an athletics administrator
designated by the athletics director) to do so, regardless of who makes the initial
contact.”).
378
Id. (“If permission is not granted, the second institution shall not encourage the
transfer and the institution shall not provide athletically related financial assistance to the
student-athlete until the student-athlete has attended the second institution for one
academic year.”).
379
“Coaches jump from program to program without having to sit out a second; the
student-athlete who transfers must sit out one season. Coaches have lucrative side
contracts and side deals; the N.C.A.A. manual has pages upon pages of rules to ensure
that athletes do not receive extra benefits.” Rhoden, supra note 206.
380
Linda S. Greene, Football Coach Contracts: What Does the Student-Athlete Have
To Do With It?, 76 UMKC L. REV. 665, 672 (2008).
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and amateurism are at the constitution and bylaws’ core, including
“the provision of ‘intercollegiate athletics programs for studentathletes . . .[,]’ the adoption of ‘eligibility rules to comply with
satisfactory standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and
amateurism . . .[,]’ and the maintenance of a distinction between its
athletic programs and those of official professional sports
leagues.”381 Indeed, the NCAA’s Constitution expressly provides,
“A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics
and professional sports.”382 But as one scholar articulated, in
reality, there are actually two separate and distinct competing
education models in intercollegiate athletics:
Under the prevailing amateur/education model,
college sports are an avocation, engaged in by
student-athletes to reap the educational, physical,
mental, and social benefits presumably derived
from athletic competition.
. . . [T]he commercial/education model, recognizes
the dynamic influence which commercialism exerts
over
intercollegiate
athletics.
The
commercial/education model, more closely
reflective of the modern day economic realities of
college sports, can thus be contrasted with the
competing amateur/education model, premised on
illusory assumptions which fail to acknowledge
commercialism as the driving force in college
athletics.383
As more collegiate athletic programs desperately search for a
“quick fix” to turn around their athletic programs, big-time
intercollegiate athletics begins to resemble the professional sports
model, and thus blurring the line of demarcation between amateur
381

Id. at 667 (citing NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 377, Bylaws 1.2(a), 1.2(c)
and 1.3.1).
382
NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 377, Bylaw 1.3.1.
383
Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting
Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 270–71 (1994).
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and professional athletics. As more college coaches are being fired
during mid-season, it creates more vacancies to be filled at
season’s end with coaches under contract at other programs.
According to renowned basketball commentator Dick Vitale,
There is no doubt that the administration has a right
to make a change, but . . . unless a coach has
violated his contract due to behavior that is not
representative of the school and has not violated his
contract morally, he should not be fired based on
wins and losses during the season.384
As Vitale puts it, “[i]t seems that the college game is now
adopting the NBA mentality,”385 in which six NBA head coaches
were fired during a 24-day period in 2008 from late November to
mid-December.386
Even in the professional context, some in the industry question
the message that is being sent when teams abruptly fire coaches
mid-season. Prominent coaches’ agent Lonnie Cooper, who
represented all six of the fired NBA head coaches, questioned how
any of these teams could claim to have improved their prospects:
“If you’re firing six guys at the beginning of the season, but you’re
replacing them with an interim coach, what’s the message you’re
sending right there? . . . Did you make a change because the
interim coach is a better coach? I haven’t figured that one out, that

384
Dick Vitale, Vitale: NBA Mentality Regarding Coaches Creeping Onto Campus,
USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/columnist/
vitale/2009-02-16-vitale-column_N.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
385
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
386
See Howard Beck, Easy Come, Easy Go, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at SP1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/sports/basketball/28agent.html?_r=3
&pagewanted=1&ref=sports.
The firings began Nov. 22, when P. J. Carlesimo was dismissed by
the Oklahoma City Thunder. Two days later, Eddie Jordan was fired
by the Washington Wizards. Sam Mitchell (Toronto) was the next to
go, then Randy Wittman (Minnesota) and Maurice Cheeks
(Philadelphia). The purge continued Dec. 15, with the Sacramento
Kings firing Reggie Theus.
Id.

C01_KARCHER_FINAL 12-30-09 (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

THE COACHING CAROUSEL

12/30/2009 10:30:28 AM

87

logic.”387 In the collegiate context, some college coaches have
noted the impact that mid-season firings have on student-athletes.
Some coaches claim that the firings send a hypocritical message to
the players, as Tennessee coach Bruce Pearl asked, “What kind of
pressures are you putting them under and what kind of message are
you sending?”388 Pearl and LSU coach Trent Johnson said that
mid-season firings are “disturbing.”389 When Georgia fired its
head basketball coach mid-season in 2009, even interim coach Pete
Herrmann publicly commented how detrimental it was to the
program as well as the student-athletes: “It’s not a good day for the
Georgia program . . . . We don’t feel that it’s in the best interests
of the team and the players in preparing for games when a decision
is made like this, but that’s the prerogative of the administration in
charge at the time.”390
The “win at all cost” mentality when it comes to a school’s
decision to hire or fire a coach may not serve the best interest of
current players in the athletic program as well as prospective
players who have signed scholarships in reliance on a particular
head coach leading the program for the term of his contract.391
Just one week after John Calipari left Memphis and signed his
multi-million dollar deal with Kentucky, which made him the
highest paid basketball coach, he indicated that some players
needed to be concerned about keeping their scholarships.392 In
describing the type of player needed for his “high-pressure, uptempo style” of play, Calipari said: “It’s not for everybody. If
they’re good enough to play here and help us win national titles, I
want you here . . . . If they’re not, I’m going to tell them the truth.

387

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vitale, supra note 384 (“When you
evaluate their NBA rosters, you don’t have to go to Harvard to figure out that changing
coaches is not the answer.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
388
Marlen Garcia, College Basketball Coaches’ Departures “Disturbing,” USA
TODAY, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2009-0129-coach-departures_N.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
389
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
390
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
391
See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 206, at D4 (referring to student-athletes under
scholarship, which is only a one-year commitment, “If your skills fade or the coaching
situation changes, you might be out.”).
392
Id.
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I’m just going to be honest.”393 There is nothing in that statement
whatsoever remotely hinting to academics or the best interest of
the student-athlete. Former NCAA President Myles Brand,
speaking in Detroit a few days before the 2009 Final Four, said,
“You have to ask some very hard questions, whether this is really
in tune with the academic values, whether we’ve reached a point
already that these high salaries and packages for coaches has really
extended beyond what’s expected within the academic
community.”394
3. Practical Considerations in Seeking Injunctive Relief
Schools might be deterred from seeking injunctive relief
because of the cost and burdens associated with prolonged
litigation as well as the fact that a relationship has deteriorated and
the school does not want an unhappy employee.395 These are some
of the oft-cited reasons by courts of equity in refusing to grant
affirmative injunctive relief in the nature of specific performance
to order an individual to perform an employment contract.396 This
section of the paper will discuss whether these concerns are
exaggerated. It will also address whether the existence of a
liquidated damages provision, as well as the absence of one,
impacts a school’s ability to obtain a negative injunction.
a) Liquidated Damages Clauses and the Availability of
Injunctive Relief
Liquidated damages clauses in college coaches’ contracts are
heavily negotiated and represent an amount, measured by the
parties prospectively at the time the contract is entered into, that
represents just compensation for the school’s damages should the
coach resign or terminate before the end of the term. The fact that
the parties negotiated and agreed upon a stipulated amount as a
reasonable estimate of the school’s damages does not suggest or
imply that irreparable harm is lacking. In other words, the fact that

393
394
395
396

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Wieberg, Hard Questions, supra note 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 248.
See supra note 262 and accompanying text; see also Rapp, supra note 260, at 271.
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money damages are deemed under the law to be an inadequate
remedy when the coach refuses to perform is not altered by the fact
that the parties agreed that the remedy for non-performance would
be a stipulated dollar amount. Thus, in Northeastern University
the court concluded that, when injunctive relief is sought, a
liquidated damages provision is not the exclusive remedy unless
the contract expressly prohibits injunctive relief.397 However, even
if the contract does not expressly prohibit such relief, a liquidated
damages clause implies that the parties contemplated substituting
the stipulated amount for the injunctive relief remedy. Contrary to
the conclusion reached in Northeastern University, the sensible
and fair result is that a liquidated damages clause should constitute
the school’s exclusive remedy.
On the other hand, failure to include a liquidated damages
clause in the contract does not imply that the parties contemplated
money damages would be adequate to compensate the school for
the coach’s non-performance. Unless the parties expressly agree
that injunctive relief would be unavailable to the school, the
absence of a liquidated damages clause should have no bearing
whatsoever on a school’s ability to obtain a negative injunction.
Indeed, to the contrary, the coach and school typically expressly
agree that the school would be irreparably harmed if the coach
refuses to perform and that injunctive relief is an available remedy
in the event of such breach.398
b) Protracted Litigation
The issuance of a negative injunction typically will not result in
prolonged litigation for the simple fact that continuing the lawsuit
is virtually a no-win situation for the coach. The coach is clearly
in breach of his contract, and by virtue of the granting of the

397

Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2004) (“It appears to the Court that Article IX does not in any way prohibit
injunctive relief, and merely deals with financial payments for money losses incurred by
Brown for leaving the University and breaching the contract.”); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 361 (1981) (“Specific performance or an injunction may be
granted to enforce a duty even though there is a provision for liquidated damages for
breach of that duty.”).
398
See supra note 314 and accompanying text..
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injunction, the court has determined that the school is likely to
succeed on the merits and that money damages are inadequate to
compensate the school. Therefore, once the court orders that the
coach is prohibited from working for somebody else, the only
feasible options are that either the coach goes back to work or
settles, unless of course the coach chooses the highly unlikely
option of sitting on his hands and not working.
Settlement is a viable solution after the issuance of an
injunction and operates as a forced buyout. Because it is likely
that the contract omitted a liquidated damages clause (otherwise
there would be no need for an injunction),399 settlement is akin to
the parties negotiating a post-breach liquidated damages clause that
they neglected to do when they entered the contract. With postbreach negotiation, not only are the parties in a better position at
that time to make a more reasonable assessment of the coach’s
market value than at the time the contract was entered, but it also
enables all three parties—the coach, the party to which he owes a
contractual obligation and the third party he wishes to join—to
fashion an appropriate remedy.400
For example, in a case factually similar to New England
Patriots, Michigan State University attempted to hire George
Perles as its head football coach when he was under contract with
the Philadelphia Stars of the former United States Football
League.401 The Stars filed suit against Michigan State and sought
damages of $1 million, and the parties settled with Michigan State
paying the Stars $175,000 to hire Perles and protect itself from
potential legal liability.402 Also, in Northeastern University, all
three parties reached a settlement in which the University of
Massachusetts agreed to pay Northeastern University $150,000 in
399

See supra notes 397–98 and accompanying text.
See Rapp, supra note 260, at 280 (“After the issuance of a decree, the parties would
simply bargain for an appropriate ‘side payment’ to settle the matter in the most efficient
way possible. . . . [T]he parties will arrive at an equilibrium transaction price that reflects
how much the player values being free of the injunction and how much the team values
preventing that player from escaping his contractual obligations.”). “A negative
injunction might be sufficient to induce a player, and the team he wishes to join, to
bargain with the team to which he owes a contractual obligation.” Id. at 271.
401
See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 247.
402
Id.
400
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order to hire its coach, but the parties also agreed that he would be
precluded from coaching the first three games of the season with
U. Mass.403 Finally, there are the numerous examples raised in this
paper of settlements reached in the NFL in the face of the league
commissioner’s rulings to prevent coaches from jumping ship.404
c) The “Unhappy Coach” Misnomer
Some believe that seeking injunctive relief to prevent a coach
from carrying out his desire to coach someplace else will lead to a
strained employment relationship with an unhappy coach.
Presumably, the belief is that a coach faced with an injunction will
be difficult to deal with and may take his frustration out on the
team and not use his best efforts to win or engage in fundraising
activity. Not only are these concerns based on pure speculation
(because it is extremely rare for schools to even seek a negative
injunction), but they also seem to be based on faulty logic. Indeed,
the substantial likelihood that a negative injunction decree (or
threat of seeking one) will lead to settlement, as history suggests,
should vitiate any unhappy coach concern.
Commentators have made similar arguments in the context of
affirmative injunctions that order professional players to perform
under their existing contracts.405 However, Professor Rapp rejects
the notion that players faced with an affirmative injunction would
have an incentive to “dog it,” noting that they would be lowering
their performance statistics which would prevent them from
403

See Blaudschuh, supra note 282.
See supra Part II.C.2.a.
405
See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Argument for Self-Help Specific Performance:
Opportunistic Renegotiation of Player Contracts, 22 CONN. L. REV. 61, 84 (1989)
(“[Serving players with an injunction can cause] opportunistic behavior by engaging in
conduct that is euphemistically known as ‘dogging it.’ In other words, he can give less
than his best efforts on the playing field, and thereby punish the club for its failure to
acquiesce to his demands, while collecting his full salary as provided by the contract.”);
Stephen C. Wichmann, Note, Players, Owners, and Contracts in the NFL: Why the SelfHelp Specific Performance Remedy Cannot Escape the Clean Hands Doctrine, 22
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 835, 843 (1999) (noting that the terms of the contract must be
sufficiently definite to permit a court to craft an appropriate order to enforce contract
obligations through an affirmative injunction and emphasizing that this poses a problem
in the athletic employment context, since most standard player contracts require a
player’s “best efforts,” which is not a sufficiently definite requirement).
404
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earning higher salaries in subsequent seasons and “performing
poorly in a season might permanently affect an athlete’s earning
trajectory for his relatively short career.”406 Rapp further notes
that there are behavioral norms and incentives in professional
sports that may not exist in the typical personal services
relationship in that “most athletes are highly competitive
individuals who have, in effect, internalized norms of
competitiveness . . . [that] might motivate them to try to win even
if they were upset about their contractual arrangements.”407
Moreover, courts have rejected the “dogging it” theory asserted by
teams seeking negative injunctions to prevent a player under
contract from signing a contract with another team for future
services to commence after the player’s current contract expires.408
Coaches are much more analogous to players than the typical
employee working in corporate America. Not only do coaches
satisfy the “unique skills” test as players do,409 but coaches are
similar to players in that, if confronted with a negative injunction,
they would have no incentive whatsoever to “dog it” while
continuing to perform under their existing contracts. One or two
mediocre seasons could preclude the coach from obtaining
performance bonuses and salary raises, and could be detrimental to
his prospects for future employment. A coach’s failure to actively
recruit could severely impact his chances for successful seasons in
the future. Finally, a half-hearted effort in carrying out various
off-field (or off-court) responsibilities, such as fundraising, would
be harmful to a coach’s reputation and could impede future
employment opportunities as well.

406

Rapp, supra note 260, at 272–73.
Id. at 273.
408
See Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 136 (S.D. Ohio 1974)
(rejecting the Bengals’ argument that “future services agreement” would reduce player’s
effectiveness with the Bengals during his existing contract); World Football League v.
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)
(arguing for the players under existing contract who signed contracts for future services
with WFL teams “will not use their best efforts for the team under their current contracts,
the morale of the entire team will suffer, the enthusiasm of the fans will wane, and the
new employers will reap the benefits of any favorable publicity for outstanding
performance of the players so signing”).
409
See supra notes 289–96 and accompanying text.
407
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CONCLUSION
At the hearing on the motions for injunctive relief in the
Northeastern University case, counsel for the coach attempted to
justify his client’s jumping ship with an explanation that “everyone
in collegiate football does this” and “what is the big deal?”410 That
sentiment is all too prevalent in the college coaching industry. To
condone a breach of contract that is “obvious, brazen and defiant”
(as described by one court)411 violates public policy and does not
comport with capitalist ideals of fair competition. The nonquantifiable harm to the public academic institutions employing
these coaches, including to the public that funds their
compensation and the student-athletes that rely on them, far
outweighs the breaching coach’s desire to maximize compensation
and justifies court intervention to deter coaches from skirting their
contractual commitments with virtual impunity.
Academic
institutions have a responsibility—morally, socially and
ethically—to make sound economic business decisions, which may
include enforcement of their coaches contracts through atypical
legal means.

410

Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
411
Id. at *4.

